An investigation into the rationality of metaphor has to take into account these three historical traditions. Yet it cannot succeed if it remains wholly within their terms. On the one hand, this investigation must first develop a well-founded and justified concept of rationality. To this end, I ascertain two general criteria for rationality, namely self-referentiality and communicability, which then serve as a basis for evaluating the reflective potential and the communicative function of metaphor. On the other hand, the investigation has to focus on an analysis of modern theories of metaphor, since they transform and reformulate the historical tradition against the background of the "linguistic turn." In order to work out the special rationality of metaphor, I thus develop a synthetic theory; I systematize the various approaches and, on this basis, propose a comprehensive theory of metaphor. The problem of the rationality of metaphor serves as a guiding and organizing principle for this synthetic metaphor theory, so that a unifying and integrated perspective is attained by orienting the inquiry toward the question of rationality, rather than by privileging any one theoretical approach. This comprehensive, problem-oriented perspective provides a foundation for analyzing the particular rationality of metaphor.
My main argument is that the fundamental function of metaphor is that of rational anticipation, whereby the rationality of this anticipation is not an always already inherent property of metaphor but must be ascertained through the critical reflection of the sense and validity of metaphor's application. From this fundamental function of rational anticipation, three basic functions can be derived, namely the creative-cognitive, the normative and world-disclosing, and the communicative-evocative functions. In discussing these functions I also work through the main dimensions of the philosophical discourse on metaphor: the dimensions of
By exploring the relationship between metaphor and truth, I investigate the question of whether and how such critical reflection is possible. Here I examine theories in the philosophy of science and epistemology. Through a reconstruction of the role of metaphor in scholarly discourse, I am able to show that metaphor has not merely a heuristic function; as metaphorical redescription, it furthermore serves as a constitutive model for thought. Metaphor can however turn into an epistemological obstacle, when it becomes reified and thus loses its "as-if" status. In this case, metaphor is transformed into a "secondary myth." I argue that the condition of possibility for a rational reflection of metaphor lies in the distinction between metaphor and secondary myth. The reflective potential of metaphor, embedded in its "as-if" structure, can be put to use by systematically extending, changing, exhausting, decontextualizing, and historicizing metaphors. I call this hermeneutical procedure of showing the achievements and limitations of metaphor "reflective metaphorization." The rationality of metaphor can only come true in this conjunction of anticipatory evidence and reflective metaphorization in rational discourse.
Theories of metaphor that are oriented only toward questions of meaning and truth remain problematic insofar as they fail to thematize cultural and historical contexts. The orientational function of metaphor can only be shown if the synchronic and diachronic network of cultural metaphors is taken into account. In this connection, I consider structuralist and historical-hermeneutical theories. Because the stock of inherited cultural images is always already a reservoir of normative practical knowledge, metaphor has an orientational and world-disclosing function. In falling back on cultural imagery and certainties, metaphor articulates and anticipates practical models of action. Yet the suggestive power of such metaphors can be used to manipulate, so that the rationality of the metaphorical anticipation must be demonstrated through critical reflection. I argue that the procedure of reflective metaphorization can render even absolute and background metaphors those metaphorical systems of orientation most deeply anchored in culture visible and therefore accessible to rational reflection.
Following my discussion of metaphor as a practical model, I ask whether and how metaphor shapes experience. Here I examine theories in epistemology, cognitive science, and (to a lesser extent) phenomenology. Based on its particular power of synthesis, metaphor can bridge the gaps between experience and thought, between imagination and concept, and between the new and the known. The central moment of this synthetic power is the iconicity of metaphor, which selectively evokes sensory perceptions and integrates them into meaningful constellations. Through this selective process, metaphor makes possible not only the conceptualization of experience but also the linkage of new to prior experience. Reflected metaphor can rationally mediate between different realms of experience and discourse.
The analysis of the communicative-evocative function of metaphor forms the conclusion of my synthetic metaphorology. In this section, I look primarily at pragmatic approaches within the analytic philosophy of language and communication theory. I argue that metaphor has a genuine function in promoting understanding (Verständigung in Habermas' sense), since it not only draws on background and experiential knowledge, but also evokes and expresses such knowledge in the first place. Through this evocative function, metaphor connects propositional and explicit with holistic and implicit knowledge. By referring to implicit knowledge, metaphor enables the sharing of common meaning. Thus metaphor is a condition for meaning in communication that is oriented toward understanding. Here, too, critical reflection is necessary to prevent metaphor from being abused as a means of manipulation. Only the reflection of metaphor in a communicative process between speaker and hearer, in which metaphorical meaning and its validity claim are negotiated, can establish the rationality of the metaphorical anticipation.
In sum, I regard metaphor as a semantic center of attraction, which drives the creative production of meaning through its anticipatory evidence and through its reflective transgression of expected meaning. The meaning of living metaphor is not predetermined but always a result of interpretive and communicative construction and reflection. The main point of reflected metaphor is that it creates a metaphorical redescription which, on the one hand, exposes the contingency of old language games and habitual metaphor, and on the other hand offers new categories and schemata that can themselves be reflected as contingent. Metaphor reflection cannot reduce contingency, yet it provides a specific (post-)modern mode of rendering conscious the contingency of laguage, existence, and history; thus broadening one's horizons and extending the insight into otherness and difference.
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