DID SOCRATES PROFESS IGNORANCE IN ORDER TO DRAW OTHERS INTO PHILOSOPHY?

 

 

 

 

 

A thesis presented to

The faculty of

The College of Arts and Sciences of Ohio University

 

In partial fulfillment

Of the requirements for the degree

Master of Arts

 

 

 

 

C.M.P. Rodgers

December 2001

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

© 2001

C.M.P. Rodgers

All Rights Reserved

This thesis entitled

DID SOCRATES PROFESS IGNORANCE IN ORDER TO DRAW OTHERS INTO PHILOSOPHY?

 

BY

C.M.P. RODGERS

 

 

 

 

 

Has been approved for

The Department of Philosophy

And the College of Arts and Sciences by

___________________________

Don Carson

Professor of Philosophy

___________________________

 

Leslie Flemming

Dean, College of Arts and Sciences
RODGERS, C.M.P.     M.A. December 2001. Philosophy

 Did Socrates Profess Ignorance in Order to Draw Others into Philosophy? (69 pp.)

Director of Thesis: Don Carson

In this paper I look at the argument of Gregory Vlastos who believed that Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge was inaccurate because Socrates had knowledge. He based this on Socrates’ claim, “… that to do injustice and disobey my superior, god or man, this I know to be evil and base.” Apology 29B6-7.  I believe that Vlastos’ use of Knowledge E and Knowledge C as ways of differentiating two common views of knowledge fails to capture the kind of knowledge that Plato’s Socrates claimed to have in the aforementioned passage. Even if we followed Vlastos’ cue and added a Knowledge B to express this type of knowledge, this does not aid in the search for a definition of knowledge. The Meno, Theaetetus and Phaedo are dialogues that are examples of the Socratic genre of writing which show the philosophical development of Plato, not the historical Socrates. Various theories were found inadequate through out the dialogues in which Plato attempted to overcome impasses he encountered in his philosophical search for knowledge. The Phaedo shows Plato believed that he would only have pure knowledge after his death. 

Approved: ____________________________________________

                                Professor of Philosophy

 

 

 

 

 

Acknowledgments:

I am grateful To Kluwer Publishers for permission to reprint:

 “Chronological summary” p73, p82 in Science Awakening.

“Monograph: Impasse” p76, p142 in Science Awakening.  

 

Table of Contents

 

Abstract………………………………………………………………..…….….…4

Acknowledgments………………………………………………………..…….….5

Chapter 1 Vlastos’ Argument…………………………………………….….……7

Chapter 2 Socratic Genre………………………………….………………..……22

Chapter 3 Meno, Theaetetus, Phaedo……………………………………………41

Chapter 4 Conclusion…………………………………………………………….50

Works Cited..……………………………………………...……………………..54

Appendix AChronological Summary.…………………...…….………………...62

Appendix B Monograph: Impasse………..…………………….………………..65 Endnotes…………………………………………………………………...……..66
 Chapter One: Vlastos’ Argument

In his book Socratic Studies,[1] Gregory Vlastos argued against the interpretations of Gulley[2]  and Irwin[3]  concerning Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge. He offered another view in which he thought he could explain why Socrates professed ignorance. In this paper, I will argue that Vlastos’ hypothesis is a restatement of Irwin’s position using different terms.

Vlastos believed that the two views were not correct. Gulley’s view was that Socrates played dumb “to encourage his interlocutor to seek out the truth, to make him think he is joining with Socrates in a voyage of discovery.” [4] Irwin’s view was that since Socrates said he had no knowledge, only true belief, we should believe him when he claims to have no knowledge.[5]  Vlastos claimed that the correct view was not either of these but a third hypothesis. He claimed his hypothesis was similar to Irwin’s except that he argued that in addition to true belief, Socrates had knowledge. He based his belief that Socrates had knowledge on the claim of Socrates in

Apology 29B6-7 where Socrates stated, “…but that to do injustice and disobey my superior, god or man, this I know to be evil and base.”

Vlastos argued that this statement alone is sufficient to show Socrates had moral knowledge. In addition to arguing that this text was enough to make his point, Vlastos argued that Socrates used the word knowledge in two ways. He believed that this was how it was possible for Socrates to claim he had no knowledge in spite of this statement found in Apology.

Vlastos used subscripts knowledge E   knowledge C to differentiate between two kinds of knowledge.

Vlastos’ Premise 1 Socrates has moral knowledge based on Apology 29B6-7

Vlastos’ Premise 2 Socrates’ moral knowledge is referred to as knowledge E everyday knowledge gained from elenchus[6]. Everyday knowledge gained from the method elenchus could also be an infallible belief/true belief.[7] Vlastos used Book V of the Republic 477E[8] to explain that philosophers during Plato’s time thought that true belief and knowledge were not the same. Knowledge was infallible (άναμάρτητου). Vlastos stressed that this meant “not capable of being wrong”- not that it meant “not in error”.[9]

Vlastos’ Conclusion Since Socrates has a kind of knowledge which Vlastos referred to as knowledge E due to premise 1, when Socrates said he had no knowledge it is because Socrates was not talking about knowledge gained from the elenchus method/everyday knowledge (Knowledge E) but certain knowledge. (Knowledge C)

An example of Socrates’ disavowal of this kind of knowledge (Knowledge C) is found in:

Apology 21D2-6: “As I was going away from this man I reasoned to myself that I am indeed wiser than he. It is unlikely that either of us knows anything noble or good. But he, having no knowledge, thinks he knows something, while I, having none, don’t think I have any.”

Definitions:

Vlastos defined moral knowledge as a kind of knowledge only accessible by elenchus.[10]

Vlastos defines elenchus as a search in the article The Socratic elenchus: method is all[11] he stated, “First and foremost elenchus is search.”

Vlastos defines everyday knowledge/human wisdom[12] as fallible knowledge that we are justified in believing as true.

An example of a justified true belief is:

John believes his horse will win on evidence of his past record;

It is true that John’s horse will win and it is true that his past record is correct;

His past record is reasonable evidence for believing that John’s horse will win;

But his past record does not entail his horse will win. His past record could be true and it could be false that his horse will win.

 

Vlastos’ example of knowledge C is true wisdom, which is infallible, and unrevisable.[13] He includes Plato’s mathematical proofs in this category. [14]

Vlastos believed that Plato’s  “whole epistemology is built on the restriction of what is known to what is necessarily true…. bona fide knowledge consists exclusively of eternal forms – entities, all of whose properties, locked into their definitions, are as immune to contingency as are the truths of logic and mathematics.” [15]  Furthermore Vlastos believed that Socrates’ ideas were “poles apart” from Plato’s. [16]

Vlastos was careful to separate views he attributed to Socrates from views he attributed to Plato.

            Vlastos argues in his article Elenchus and Mathematics: A Turning Point in Plato’s Philosophical Development [17] that the historical Plato had studied mathematics by the time he wrote the middle books of the Republic. He believed that the importance of the study of mathematics is evident in the specification in the Republic that the future rulers of his ideal polis would have ten years devoted to mathematical studies. Vlastos noted that Plato believed that mathematics “in every way draws us towards reality…”. Republic 521C10-523A3 During Plato’s study of mathematics, Vlastos claimed he abandoned the elenchus method and reasoned that all learning was “recollecting”. To demonstrate this, Plato had a conversation in the Meno with a slave who was helped to recollect geometrical truths. In the Meno, Socrates believed that if he could show that the slave boy who had no geometry background could be shown to have “knowledge” concerning geometry, it must be because of innate knowledge.

            In his article on Elenchus and Mathematics, Vlastos mentioned the Meno and Theodorus, but did not say much about Theaetetus or the dialogue Theaetetus. In his book Socratic Studies there are only five references to the Theaetetus. This is because Vlastos believed that the Theaetetus was a Platonic dialogue, not a Socratic one. He referred to it as a “post-elenctic Platonic dialogue.”[18]  To understand what he meant as post-elenctic, it is helpful to know what the word “elenctic” means. This word comes from the verb έλέγχέιν, which means to refute. [19] It is used as a word to describe what Socrates does in arguments.

            Vlastos believed that the main aim of the elenchus was “ coming to know what is true and what is false” because of Gorgias 505E and 486 E.[20]  If we look at these passages we also see that in the same breath Socrates said “…I do not speak with any pretense to knowledge, but am searching along with you…”(Gorgias 505e) Vlastos used Gorgias 486E to imply more than what is stated. In that passage, Socrates was posing a hypothetical. He said to Callicles “… if you agree with the opinions held by my soul, then at last we have attained the actual truth.” Socrates then went on to humor Callicles to claim that many people lacked the qualities of Callicles and were therefore unable to test Socrates because they lacked “knowledge, good will and frankness”(Gorgias 486E). Vlastos may be correct that the aim of elenchus was the knowledge of true and false, but this does not mean Socrates attained it.

 Vlastos’ ideas concerning the “Socratic Elenchus” have changed over the last thirty-five years[21], but he believes his current views are more correct than the one he expounded in the 1956 Plato’s Protagorus. Vlastos noted that Plato used the term in Book VII of the Republic at 534C1-3.[22]  At Republic 534C1-4 Plato’s Socrates stated,

 “…the man who is unable to define in his discourse and distinguish and abstract from all other things the aspect of idea of the good, and who cannot, as it were in battle, running the gauntlet of all the tests, and striving to examine everything by essential reality and not by opinion, hold on his way through all this without tripping on his reasoning – the man who lacks this power, you will say, does not really know the good itself or any particular good, but if he apprehends any adumbration of it, his contact with it is by opinion, not by knowledge, and dreaming and dozing through his present life, before he awakens here he will arrive at the house of Hades and fall asleep forever?”

 

Vlastos thinks that this does not weaken his argument because he saw the Republic  books II though X as a Platonic doctrine, which reflected the philosophy of Plato, not Socrates. The “Theory of the Forms” was solely a Platonic idea according to Vlastos, so it would be irrelevant to the debate on whether or not Socrates believed he had knowledge, instead of true belief or opinion.

Another passage in which Vlastos said was proof that Socrates had knowledge is found in his article on Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge.[23]  There Vlastos implied that since Socrates did not reiterate his lack of knowledge after “proving” a proposition, he must have attained knowledge. This was because the proof was “uncontested and apparently conclusive” according to Vlastos. This argument would suggest that people could have knowledge as long as others were not challenging their ideas at a level sufficient to overturn their conclusions. An example of this would be for one to think they had knowledge of friendly extraterrestrial life based on many stories of encounters with UFO’s. Instead of this conclusion being scrutinized by experts in the field of study, let’s say we ask kindergarten students to challenge the idea. Since they are not able to come up with a good argument that would make us think otherwise, therefore would we accept our conclusion that there is friendly extraterrestrial life. If the experts never come forward to dispute this conclusion does it mean that the conclusion is correct? Infallible? Vlastos argued that if Socrates believed a conclusion was apparently true, it was necessarily absolutely true. If this were so, it would be reasonable to think that Socrates would eventually stop searching for definitions. Instead in the Theaetetus, Plato’s Socrates sought for a definition of knowledge and after several attempts the dialogue ended without an acceptable definition. In the Meno, Plato’s Socrates argued that knowledge was recollected from our existence before birth. In the Phaedo, Plato’s Socrates argued that after death he would have knowledge of things he could not know while he was confined by his body. Each of these present three different views on the nature of knowledge. It seems that it is more correct to say that Plato’s Socrates was not sure what knowledge was, but believed that he was lacking something – pure knowledge.

            Vlastos believed that the historical forty-year-old Plato studied advanced mathematics with Archytas.[24] This love of mathematics was enough to make Plato adapt a new method according to Vlastos who asks, “Is any product of the human imagination more beautiful than are some of the proofs in Euclid?” [25]

Plato continued studying geometry with Archytas and other mathematicians including Theodorus.[26] Although Vlastos does not mention the Theaetetus often in his articles on elenchus, I think he would agree that Plato’s Socrates uses the elenchus method again to lead Theaetetus on to philosophical truths concerning the nature of knowledge. It would seem that the type of definition of knowledge that Plato is seeking is of the knowledge C because he rejects the definitions that are not infallible. Definitions based on perception and true belief are rejected. Even the definition based on true belief with an account is rejected in the end. Plato’s Socrates, Theodorus and Theaetetus end the dialogue without succeeding in finding a definition for knowledge. Other attempts at discovering the nature of what something was had failed in the past so we should not be surprised to find that this search fails too.

            Since Vlastos was careful to separate the philosophy of Socrates from Plato, perhaps he addressed the reintroduction of the elenchus method found in the Theaetetus in his book Platonic Studies.[27] Plato had learnt in the past that the elenchus method did not aid in finding infallible knowledge, so why did he revert to it again. If geometry could lead to infallible knowledge why did Plato’s Socrates engage him by the elenchus method? Would not Theaetetus’ mathematical studies eventually lead him to a reality that could not be reached in any other way? Was Plato’s Socrates just trying to reaffirm in Theaetetus’ mind the beauty of mathematics? Theaetetus was much younger than the ideal age for studying mathematics according to the Republic. Was Plato’s Socrates attempting to teach him in the elenchus method because Theaetetus’ teacher had abandoned philosophy years ago? Was Plato’s Socrates concerned that Theaetetus had not been exposed to the questioning of theories that he takes Theaetetus through in the dialogue?

Vlastos placed the Theaetetus after the Meno in which he had claimed that Plato’s Socrates had abandoned the elenchus method. Was Socrates in a rut or is he trying to teach young Theaetetus, the value of questioning what he believed to be true? Using Vlastos’ notions of Knowledge c and  knowledge E what can one expect to be able to discover through geometry or philosophy?

According to Vlastos in his article on the Socratic Fallacy, geometry is known as knowledge C.[28] This is clear in his statement,

“In geometry, whose domain is that of knowledge C, not knowledge E, propositions [G] and [R] must be read as [GC] and [RC], and then they will be true, not vacuously so.”[29]

From this we can see that Vlastos believed that geometrical knowledge was not gained from the elenchus method and was infallible and therefore certain. To fully understand what Vlastos meant in this statement, more is needed on propositions [G] and [R].

 Vlastos named this first proposition after Peter Geach whose 1966 article Vlastos disagreed with.[30]

Proposition [G] If you do not know what the F is, you will not know if you are predicating “F” correctly about anything whatever – you will not know if anything is F.

Vlastos limited F to moral predicates. If we read this proposition but substitute a moral predicate (noun) such as virtue, piety, courage, justice etc. for the “F” we can better understand what Geach meant. Let’s suppose we decide to substitute virtue for the “F”. In this instance we would have the proposition:

If you do not know what the virtue is, you will not know if you are predicating  “virtue” correctly about anything whatever – you will not know if anything is virtue.

Vlastos believed something was wrong with this proposition and did not think Socrates would have accepted it. If we take this further and substitute “Frazoulee” for the “F” in this we would have: Proposition [G] If you do not know what the “Frazoulee” is, you will not know if you are predicating “Frazoulee” correctly about anything whatever – you will not know if anything is “Frazoulee”. Since “Frazoulee” is a newly made-up word that has no widely known meaning, people would have difficulty “knowing” what is meant by the term. The word is not in dictionaries. The only way that one would know if they were using the word correctly would be if the one who came up with the word explained to them the meaning of “Frazoulee”. It is possible to think that the word could be a noun while another might think that it is an adjective. Was Vlastos seeking to understand the quality of “F” or the thing “F”? There is a difference between having a certain degree of knowledge (Quality) and having knowledge. (noun) Do we settle for a lesser degree of knowledge that we call knowledge that really is not knowledge? Do we ever really have “pure knowledge” or true knowledge” or knowledge C as Vlastos calls it?

            Consideration also has to be given to what Vlastos meant by the word “Proposition”. According to Merrian Websters dictionary[31] the word has two meanings:


1 a (1): something offered for consideration or acceptance (2) a:  the point to be discussed or maintained in argument usually stated in sentence form near the outset b: a theorem or problem to be demonstrated or performed
2 a: an expression in language or signs of something that can be believed, doubted, or denied or is either true or false b: the objective meaning of a proposition.

 

            It is possible to claim that Vlastos only meant to state the propositions as sentences that show the problem of knowledge that he was addressing. If this is the case parts (1) and (2) would apply. If he meant more than this and meant to argue that the sentences are either true or false, he could be referring to beliefs about what we think is true or beliefs about what we think is false. Based on what Vlastos argued was the belief during Plato’s time that knowledge is always infallible, he could not be referring to knowledge if it were possible for the statements to be false.

 Irwin argued that even if Socrates could not know what the F was he could still have true beliefs that would guide him. Vlastos called this the “sufficiency of true belief” (STB) interpretation and argued that Socrates’ conclusions in Hippas Major 304 D-E are evidence for a different interpretation. At HMa.304 D-E Socrates states:

 “He will ask me if I am not ashamed to dare discuss fine practices when elenctic refutation makes it evident that I don’t even know what on earth the fine itself is. ‘So [a] how will you know,’ he will ask me, ‘if anyone has produced a fine speech or any other fine performance whatever, when you do not know the fine? And [b] when this is your condition, do you think you are better off alive than dead?” Here Proposition [G] would read: If you do not know what the Fine is, you will not know if you are predicating “Fine” correctly about anything whatever – you will not know if anything is Fine. It is reasonable to think that Plato’s Socrates would also agree that this proposition could also be read as: Proposition [G] If you do not know what the “F knowledge” is, you will not know if you are predicating “F knowledge” correctly about anything whatever – you will not know if anything is “F knowledge”.

Vlastos argued that the verb to know had two different meanings. Once the proposition was rewritten to read:

[GE]“If you do not know E what the F is, you will not know E if anything is F” the proposition is false according to Vlastos. He argued that in order to reflect Socrates’ position, the proposition would need to read:

[G*] If you do know what the F is, you will know if you are predicating “F” correctly about anything whatever – you will know if anything is F.

            Vlastos named the second proposition after Richard Robinson. This proposition was:

[R] If you do not know what the F is, you will not know if you are predicating correctly anything about the F – you will not know anything about the F.

 This proposition stresses the importance of the “priority of definition”.  Because it is necessary to have some idea of what one is looking for, those who search for virtue without some prior knowledge of what virtue is will not find it.[32]

            In the Meno, Plato’s Socrates found a way to access real knowledge. This type of knowledge or knowledge C is recollected from knowledge held before one’s many births.[33]  Socrates stated that he does not know what virtue is at Meno 71 A-B so he cannot say whether or not virtue is teachable. Plato’s Socrates believed that moral virtue was the same in men and women[34] Since Vlastos viewed the Meno as a transitional dialogue[35] in which the philosophy of Socrates was being replaced with the philosophy of Plato, he did not associate the Socratic method of Elenchus to the dialogue in the latter part of the conversation with the Meno’s slave. Vlastos described the dialogue as maieutic not elenctic.[36] By maieutic, Vlastos was referring to the method of Socratic inquiry that stressed the eliciting of new ideas from those who are involved in the dialogues. This is different from elenctic due to the fact that the word maieutic has to do with midwifery. In the Theaetetus, Plato’s Socrates stated that he practiced the art of midwifery like his mother, but that he delivers the offspring of minds and is able to try them to see if they are worth having. Since in the maieutic method the ideas come from Socrates’ eliciting them from others, is it any different from the knowledge that would result from recollection? Could it not be found through searching (elenchus method)? Is there a real difference between these methods? If we must know what the “F” is in order to know when we have found it, what are we searching for? It would seem that we would already know the “F”. If we are searching for something it would seem that we are using the elenchus method, but Vlastos did not say that this was the case. He believed that when we sough solutions to geometrical problems we were gaining knowledge C  which is certain knowledge. This is not Knowledge E because knowledge E is only gained by the elenchus method. So are we to say that knowledge of geometry does not come by any search, but by someone drawing knowledge of geometry from us? Does this differ from knowledge that we would have had if we were merely “recollecting” the axioms that we “discovered”? Vlastos did not think that there was reason to believe that Socrates thought that the truths in the domain of … mathematics...were to be ascertained by elenctic argument.[37] He saw geometry as being knowledge-c. [38]  Like Geach’s proposition, Vlastos argued that Robinson’s proposition needed corrected to read:

[R*] If you do know what the F is, you will know whether or not you are predicating correctly anything about the F – you will know whether or not the F is anything –[39] The difference between (1) Proposition G and Proposition R and (2) Proposition G* and Proposition R* can be understood better if we think of the asterick as representing at least a speck of knowledge about what something is. If we look for what the literal meaning of what this could have been for Vlastos, we can look at Merriam-Webster dictionary to see that the asterisk is “used in printing or writing as a reference mark, as an indication of the omission of letters or words, to denote a hypothetical or unattested linguistic form, or for various arbitrary meanings”.[40] Since these propositions that contained the astericks had non-arbitrary meanings, we can reason that the meaning of the asterick in these propositions by Vlastos was to refer to a form of the word using his hypothetical meaning in which one would have knowledge of a thing before trying to discover what that thing was. This seems circular because we would have at the onset the knowledge of the thing we were looking for. This would mean that in order to define what something is without knowing what it is in the first place would be impossible to do. If this is so, it is no wonder Plato’s Socrates and Theaetetus failed in their attempt to define knowledge.

            This problem of having a clear definition disappears when Plato’s Socrates includes the elements of geometry such as “squares, circles and lines” in the dialogues.[41] Vlastos believed that the years that Plato spent in his mathematical studies resulted in Plato being more advanced in geometry than the historical Socrates. Advanced mathematical studies could result in a kind of enlightenment that is similar to religious conversion which might account for the “theory of recollections” held by Plato. [42]

            Vlastos believed that Socrates would converse with anyone on philosophy as long as they would agree to “say what you believe”.[43]  He argued that Socrates would welcome anyone based on two passages. The first is found in Apology 29D. There he quoted Socrates as welcoming:

 “… any one of you I happen to meet at any given time…”, and the other is found in Apology 30A where he claims Socrates is welcoming:

“… anyone, young or old, citizen or foreigner.”  The stipulation that the interlocutor must “say what they believe” is required according to Vlastos. This rule stressed the need for those involved in the dialogue to give their opinion or belief as they saw the truth at the time.   

Can we tell the correct ordering of the dialogues? Can we tell if the views expressed were Plato’s philosophy or Socrates’ philosophy? Vlastos argued that Socrates and Plato’s ideas on knowledge differed and that the Platonic dialogues supported this claim. [44] He believed that the dialogues could be arranged into three distinct periods: early, middle and late. This view made it possible for the Socrates of the early dialogues to be a more historically accurate Socrates than the Socrates of the middle dialogues. Vlastos believed that in the middle dialogues, the character Socrates was more of a mouthpiece for Plato’s ideas [45], while in the early dialogues the character Socrates voiced the ideas of the historical Socrates.  Since Vlastos placed the Theaetetus in the middle dialogues, the dialogue would be seen as more reflective of Plato’s philosophy than Socrates’. Plato’s Socrates carefully chose the main character of the dialogue. As the star pupil of the geometer Theodorus, Theaetetus was asked for a definition of knowledge. He responded with examples of what he thought knowledge was.

In the next chapter, I will discuss the Socratic genre and argue that Vlastos’ differentiation between Socratic philosophy and Platonic philosophy may not be correct. In addition, Vlastos’ differentiation between the two forms of the noun knowledge, are merely two examples of kinds of beliefs.  I will argue that it is also important to take each dialogue as a work that should be looked at in it’s entirety without worrying that part of the ideas within it might conflict with another dialogue. Vlastos might agree that since the mathematical truths of geometry are able to take us to a level only one step removed from the Platonic Forms of the Republic, when we speak of perfect circles and straight lines we are approaching that which we can only believe must exist and that we do not actually experience them first hand. It is this closeness to the Platonic Forms that appeals to our rational side. If degrees of reality are merely copies, when we follow Vlastos’ argument without trying to separate Socratic philosophy from Platonic philosophy all we have are examples of what can only be various opinions on what real knowledge might be. This is no different than Irwin’s ideas on true belief, therefore Vlastos is incorrectly referring to true belief as knowledge C and is not offering anything new.

 

 Chapter Two: Socratic Genre

 

I do not think we should regard the character Socrates found in the Platonic dialogues as a historical figure for two reasons. First, the literary style known as the Socratic genre has the characteristic of being so realistic that the parts of the dialogue that involve historical figures seem historically accurate. Second, in order to reach future generations, Plato, unlike Socrates, left his work in written form. As the author, the ideas are his. Since he was taught by Socrates in an often one-to–one dialogue, it was convenient for Plato to use the dialogue format to show how philosophical ideas develop. Because Socrates is often one of the characters, we should not assume that the historical Socrates necessarily said or believed what Plato had the character Socrates say.

In this chapter, I will argue that the Socratic genre was a style of writing common during Plato’s time and the philosophies expounded in the dialogues are not necessarily those of Socrates. With this in mind, Vlastos’ claim concerning Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge is reduced to Irwin’s view. This means that when Plato’s Socrates said he had no knowledge, only true belief, we should not make more of it than what was written. Furthermore, we should attribute the statement to the character – Plato’s Socrates – not historical Socrates. Vlastos’ argument that the historical Socrates had knowledge based on Apology 29B6-7 is invalid. In this passage Plato has the character Socrates claim, “…but that to do injustice and disobey my superior, god or man, this I know to be evil and base.” If we see this as a due to the Socratic genre style of writing that Plato practiced, is it possible to trace the idea back to historical Socrates as Vlastos had in his arrangement of the dialogues?

Some scholars have arranged the dialogues in an order different from the order Vlastos believed to be accurate as of 1991[46]. In 1978 W.K.C. Guthrie[47] attempted to establish historical dates for the writing of the dialogues and dramatic dates for the settings of the dialogues. In 1962, I.M. Crombie[48] argued that stylometrics was the most accurate means of organizing the dialogues. Others including Charles Kahn believe that there are many reasons why we should not accept the traditional division of the dialogues into those representative of the historical Socrates and his philosophy and Platonic philosophy. These reasons include:

 

1.      the Platonic dialogues were written so long ago[49];

2.      There are too many inconsistencies in what we know of the dates of some of the characters birth and death that would have made it impossible for them to have been involved in the dialogues.[50]

3.      Just because some of the characters of the dialogues are historical people, it does not necessarily follow that the conversations recorded in the dialogues actually took place. [51]

4.       Socratic Genre was a popular form of writing during Plato’s time;[52]

 

Of these reasons the fact that the “Socratic Genre” was a style of writing for many during Plato’s time is too important to take lightly. If we think of the Theaetetus as an example of the genre of Socratic writing that was prevalent during Plato’s time, we can see each of the dialogues as possibly containing some of the many ways in which Socrates could have been portrayed. This way we are less likely to think of the historical Socrates[53]. 

If we view the Platonic dialogues as literary examples of the “Socratic Genre”, we are more apt to see them as artistic creations of Plato’s. By using various “Socratic themes”, philosophers such as Socrates could be portrayed in “main dramatic roles”.[54]  The views of the main character could have been those of anyone, in order to serve as a means of presenting various positions and arguments. This way of dealing with the dialogues makes it possible to take each dialogue as a whole, without trying to clear up discrepancies that we notice in the views of the various main characters in the Platonic dialogues. When we see the dialogues as the literary work that reflects his philosophical development through the years we can see why a position could be argued for in one dialogue and another in other dialogues. An example of this is the Theory of Recollection found in the Meno and the Phaedo, but no mention of this theory in the Theaetetus. It could have been that Plato had not thought of this theory when writing the Theaetetus or that he had abandoned it, or wanted to try a new approach to the problem of the nature of knowledge after already writing on the Theory of Recollection.

Plato could have written in verse, speeches or essays, but instead chose to use the dialogue form of writing. The dialogue form served to show the arguments of various positions as they unfolded. Some argue that Plato wanted to be able to influence future pupils in and out of the Academy by exposing them to the various questions in philosophy just as his teacher did for him. [55] I find this position plausible because it is the general aim of most teachers to influence the search for knowledge of their students. By introducing students to various authors and ideas we hope that they will gain interest in a subject and continue their studies. Kenneth Sayre’s book, Plato’s Literary Garden, captures this idea quite well. He uses the metaphor of a garden with seeds and young plants to show how Plato wanted to influence young philosophers.

I think that Plato recognized that his teacher would eventually be regarded as one of the greatest philosophers from Greece. By including him as a character in the dialogues, Plato was immortalizing Socrates. It would not matter if the ideas were solely those of Socrates or of Plato. Many times it is difficult to separate the ideas of the teacher from the ideas of the pupil when two people have spent so much time together. Many times the teacher “plants” ideas in the minds of students and with time these ideas grow into a more developed system of beliefs.

During Plato’s time it was common to discuss ideas concerning geometry within philosophical dialogues. Examples of this can be seen in the Theaetetus. Since philosophy was not broken down into various sub-categories, philosophers were familiar with the theories of mathematicians, astronomers and scientists. The chronological summary in Appendix A shows various people who are known for their accomplishments in the Greek philosophy, mathematics and astronomy. Although Theaetetus is listed as having lived in 390 B.C. during the time of Socrates and Plato, this does not necessarily mean that all of the facts concerning Theaetetus in Plato’s Theaetetus are historical.

In order to discover if Plato correctly gave credit to the character Theaetetus, some mathematicians have looked at the development of similar theories to determine where the theories began. In the book, Science Awakening, B.L. van der Waerden attempted to trace the history of mathematical theories back to Greek, Egyptian and Babylonian times. He concluded that some of historical accounts of the mathematicians are not correct. Even if there were accurate accounts that would help trace the mathematical theories, this would not necessarily imply that the philosophical ideas are also historical. The fact that there are parts of the dialogues that are historically accurate tends to make the reader think that therefore the conversations actually occurred.  Just as there are problems for mathematicians in determining the historicity of the mathematical theories, there are problems with the historicity of philosophical theories.

 At one point van der Waerden acknowledged the difficulty in tracing mathematical theories back to the Greeks, Egyptians and Babylonians when he stated: “We do not know in whose brain this thought arose for the first time, nor when this happened.” [56] This debate is taken up by mathematicians who attempt to trace the various mathematical theories.  Many times when we try to trace the history of various thoughts, the source is difficult to discover. Van der Waerden concluded that parts of the Theaetetus contained some references to actual theoretical developments in the intellectual community of Athens.  He stated:

“Theodorus … is not too old to give a lecture on incommensurable line segments which arouses the deep interest of the young Athenians Theaetetus and Socrates. As a result of this lecture, Theaetetus started thinking; and he found a general solution of the problem which Theodorus had treated for a few special cases. He classified all line segments, which produce commensurable squares, into those which are commensurable and those which are incommensurable.” [57]

 

 

Because we find it interesting to know who thought what first, we try to find evidence for such claims. Today we expect those who claim to know to leave their thoughts in writing so these thoughts can be passed on to others. From their writings, we often discover the historical date of the writing if it is not clear. From this we can give credit to those who made various discoveries first. When sufficient evidence is lacking, some may guess at who came up with the ideas first and who influenced whom. But this should not be our main focus. Instead we should aim to discover what theories were developed and what arguments supported these theories. Likewise we should look at those theories that were abandoned to see if they answer any of the difficulties we have encountered.

Although Vlastos had reasons for thinking the ideas in the “early” dialogues were those of Socrates, we can not know if Socrates actually had those thoughts unless we found writings of Socrates to back up this claim or several documents written by various philosophers who actually quoted Socrates. We lack the real evidence needed to replace much of the guesswork of who believed what. Because of this we should accept that all the ideas in the Platonic dialogues were included, because Plato was familiar with the theories and felt they were important to include.

Vlastos thought that the Platonic dialogues should be divided into three groups: early, middle and later period.[58] He identified the earlier dialogues as “Socratic” because they had ideas in common that Vlastos thought could be attributed to Socrates. In this “Socratic” group there are fourteen dialogues: Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthydemus, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Hippias Major, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, Lysis, Menexenus, Protagorus, and Republic Book I.[59] Just because the dialogues had many philosophical ideas in common, I do not think that that is sufficient to categorize them as “Socratic”. Vlastos appears to be begging the question when he claimed that the fourteen dialogues he identified as “Socratic” were “Socratic” because they have the same philosophical ideas that he claimed were “Socratic.” To categorize them as “Socratic” takes away from the recognition due to Plato, since they are Plato’s creative philosophical works done in the style used in Plato’s time. It would be more accurate to state that many of the fourteen Platonic dialogues identified by Vlastos as “Socratic” share a similar character (Socrates) and similar themes or ideas but this does not necessarily make them “Socratic”. Since we know that Plato wrote the dialogues, they should be referred to as “Platonic”, not “Socratic”.

I think the writings of Plato are problematic partially because the style is not like our writing style today. It is difficult to know if the ideas are his, or if he is presenting the ideas that he held in common with Socrates. Since many others were writing Socratic literary during Plato’s time, I think that it is very plausible that the various Platonic dialogues are just examples of the ways in which Plato wrote in this style of writing. I agree with Kahn that the ideas within the Platonic dialogues are all Plato’s based on the fact that Plato was the author of the dialogues. By including the character Socrates, Plato was able to develop different philosophical ideas as his philosophical development took place.

Plato was able to get many different ideas across using this method of writing. He did not necessarily have to believe the same ideas as the character Socrates of his dialogues. He did not have to make the stories historically accurate. He did not need to check with the various characters of the dialogues to find out what was actually said during the various conversations. It is possible that the characters and stories are mostly fictional. I think that Plato was more interested in getting the ideas passed from generation to generation, than trying to make a historical account of events. 

Vlastos believed that Socrates would philosophize with anyone and professed ignorance in order to draw them in. If we viewed the dialogues as written by Plato as a secretary of Socrates, it would seem that the desire to philosophize with anyone, meant anyone but Plato. If one thought that the fourteen dialogues that Vlastos referred to as “Socratic” were actual accounts of conversations the historical Socrates had, one might agree with Vlastos that Socrates would welcome anyone into a philosophical search. Vlastos based this on two passages:

Apology 29D: “… any one of you I happen to meet at any given time…”, and     Apology 30A: “… anyone, young or old, citizen or foreigner.” 

Unlike Vlastos, I do not think Plato’s Socrates had to draw others into philosophical discussions. I do not think Plato characterizes him as one who philosophized with just anyone who would argue with him. Although the character Socrates could use just about anyone to make a point in his argument, Plato was careful to pick the right type of knowledge seeking character for the longer philosophical discussions in the dialogues. An example of this careful selection is found in the Theaetetus. At the beginning of the discussion between Socrates and Theodorus (who was a geometry instructor), Plato has Socrates voice his concern for his fellow Athenians. Socrates inquired if Theodorus had come across any Athenians who appeared to be naturally gifted. Theaetetus immediately came to mind as one who had “extraordinary natural gifts”. Socrates recognized the youth as the son of the late Euphronius of Sounium (520BC-470BC) who had also been similarly gifted. (Theaetetus 144a)

An example of a case in which Plato’s Socrates encountered someone unexpectedly is found in the Euthyphro[60]. In this dialogue Socrates was on his way to answer the indictment when Euthyphro started asking him questions about what he was doing away from the Lyceum. The character Euthyphro was a “prophet” who was the prosecutor in an upcoming murder case against his own father. Euthyphro claimed to know what was “pious” and what was “impious”, so Plato had Socrates assume the role of a pupil who was hoping to learn from Euthyphro what “pious” meant. After Euthyphro began to answer Socrates’ questions with examples in the same manner as Theaetetus, Euthyphro tried other approaches, but failed to come up with a definition. When Socrates responded to Euthyphro’s claim that it was difficult for Socrates’ propostitions to stay put he replied that it was Socrates who was the mythical “Daedalus”[61].(Euthyphro 15d). The dialogue is cut short as Euthyphro becomes frustrated. Socrates claimed he wanted to start over with a new approach for finding a definition for “pious”, but Euthyphro hurried off. (Euthyphro 16)[62]

Plato’s Socrates believed he was able to differentiate between student who were gifted with an ability to discover and those who were not. (Theaetetus 150c) Those who were not gifted with an ability to discover (Theaetetus 150d) were sent away to be matched up with “Prodicus, and several to other wise and gifted men.” (Theaetetus151b) Vlastos’ premise concerning the inducement of interlocutors is false because the opposite is true. Socrates did not induce interlocutor’s to join him as much as he weeded out those who were not as he called them—“pregnant”. By doing this Plato’s Socrates was able to question a wide variety of theories concerning the nature of knowledge in the Theaetetus.

In order to reach such students in the future, Plato’s Socrates uses the dialog format as a means of serving as a “midwife” to the minds of future gifted students.  This format enables us to put ourselves in to the place of the various interlocutors with whom we share the same ideas. An example of this is in the Theaetetus. When we see various definitions of knowledge put forth, examined and rebuked we develop our own ideas as to where the argument could have been improved or where we might think the inquiry should have gone. In the end of the Theaetetus we may feel that Plato’s Socrates and Theaetetus gave up too soon and were on the right track. It does not matter with whom the thoughts originated in the text. The result is the same. The Theaetetus, like the other Platonic dialogues, makes us think.

By taking us to an impasse in the dialogues, Plato is able to accomplish this. We may become frustrated and think that we were tricked somewhere within the dialogue to have ended up so confused. We may identify with the characters that share our ideas or we may become upset with the character Socrates.

Three examples of interlocutors from various Platonic dialogues who became upset and accused Socrates of being always asking questions of others and then cross-examining them while refusing to answer himself are: [63]

 

 

 

In all three of the above examples of Platonic dialogues involving various characters, Plato puts Socrates into a position in which he had to carry on a conversation with someone who he had not originally hoped to debate with. In the Gorgias, the character Socrates planned to debate with Gorgias. Young Polus and Callicles were just people in the crowd that picked up on the argument after Gorgias seemed to give in too easily. Although Plato’s Socrates is able to use the various characters to make his points in the debate, he did not choose them. Socrates had not wanted to debate Polus, because Polus could not keep his answers brief. After repeatedly being insulted by Callicles with name-calling such as “bully” (Gorgias 505d), Plato’s Socrates suggested that Callicles continue the argument so that it can be settled. When Socrates has succeeded in getting Callicles to be quiet, Socrates draws him back into the argument by asking him if he (Socrates) is right or not for closure of the argument. (Gorgias 509c).

Since Socrates was insulted by Thrasymachus, Polus, Callicles and they were very eager to engage Socrates in conversation, I do not see Socrates’ frequent questioning as a means to pull others into the conversations. Many times it is the case that people are waiting to challenge him. 

Vlastos challenged Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge by picking up on one instance in which Socrates seemed to claim that he had “knowledge” even though he repeatedly said he had no knowledge. This disavowal of knowledge was seen to be a ploy because Vlastos believed that Socrates genuinely had knowledge when he said:

 T1Apology 29B6-7: “…but that to do injustice and disobey my superior, god or man, this I know to be evil and base.”

This “knowledge” in this passage was knowledge of virtue though and pertained to religious beliefs. Vlastos failed to account for this type of “knowledge” in his division of the types of knowledge into the two categories (referred to as knowledge C and knowledge E as defined in the previous chapter). For some people there is a state of “knowing a belief” which leads them to have “knowledge due to conviction” that is similar to the state of “knowing” C due to “knowledge of a Truth”. This state of “knowing a belief” is not always accepted by those who do not share the same conviction when faced with the same “knowledge E”. Vlastos’ failure to distinguish between beliefs that only seem to be based on knowledge C and real knowledge made it necessary for him to come up with reasons to support the view that Socrates was only playing dumb.

Vlastos also failed to realize that the character Socrates of the Platonic dialogues was just that—a character.  Plato had the freedom to make the character Socrates say or believe anything Plato wanted. The dialogues did not need to be consistent with each other concerning their characters or philosophical ideas. We usually accept that an author’s opinions and philosophical ideas may change over time also. This makes it possible for Plato in one dialogue to refer to the Theory of Recollection as a theory of knowledge and then omit the theory in another dialogue.

I think Plato included Socrates questions in the dialogues (which Vlastos often took to be disavowal of knowledge for the historical Socrates) as a way to bring up various views in the dialogues. This questioning is especially true in the Gorgias as they attempted to discover how one should live. Toward the end of the dialogue we are cautioned by Socrates to not neglect geometry (Gorgias 508a) and to care about the judging of our soul’s after this life. Plato had Socrates voice various opinions and beliefs throughout the dialogue.

If there seems to be inconsistency between the various dialogues, this is more reason for believing that Plato was merely writing in the Socratic genre and was not trying to make the character Socrates the same character in all of the dialogues. Ideas and opinions of writers and characters change. Plato as author retained the freedom of using the character Socrates to voice unpopular opinions when necessary. These were merely opinions of the character Socrates though. To make more out of the dialogues than that is to join the characters of the dialogues in their accusations against Socrates as one who knew but refused to say so.

If we can have assurance by knowledge, assurance by true belief, or assurance by false beliefs, it is not always possible to know what our assurances are based on.  Since one way of trying out our beliefs is to find out if other people share our beliefs, Plato’s Socrates had to find people who would actually say what they believed. Since it can be embarrassing to be the one who thought he or she had genuine knowledge and then to have the inconsistencies and contradictions pointed by Socrates, many reacted with anger. Socrates had difficulty finding people that would answer truthfully. Name calling and blaming were oftentimes the result. Those who were sure that they knew the answers such as Euthyphro frequently ended up blaming Socrates for their inability to answer his questions.

It is possible that Plato could have portrayed these characters as angry in order to add drama to the dialogues. The contrast between Socrates’ manner and the various upset interlocutors in the dialogues serve to help in the creation of the various characters. In addition, the manner in which Socrates handles those who accuse him of pretending to seek the truth adds interest. We can easily picture Socrates and the other characters gathered around without the kinds of entertainment we are accustomed to and imagine them as needing to come up with something entertaining to do. Likewise we can easily picture Plato as a gifted writer who was able to write in such a manner that makes it easy to imagine that the character Socrates was meant to be the real Socrates. Once we accept that Plato's dialogues are nothing more than Plato’s ideas and way of doing philosophy, we can move past the questions of whether or not the real Socrates was being sincere when he claimed he did not know something such as the nature of knowledge. Plato had the character Socrates claim he did not have knowledge, in order to show the reader that it was not everyday knowledge that he was seeking.

Vlastos described “Socratic elenchus” as a “search for moral truth by question-and-answer adversary argument in which a thesis is debated only if asserted as the answerer’s own belief and is regarded as refuted only if its negation is deduced from his own beliefs.”[64]  Since this search begins with beliefs, it is reasonable to think that the conclusion is a belief. Since beliefs are not the same as objective knowledge or knowledge C it does not follow that Socrates is discovering moral truths that are objective based on arguments that begin with the beliefs of interlocutors that Socrates does not agree with from the start. The deductive elenctic arguments cannot give the answers that were sought, but they can tell us for certain that the views held were false.

Vlastos believed that there were four distinct events in the “standard elenchus”, although this pattern may have varied slightly[65]. These were:

(1)   Someone asserts a thesis, p

(2)   Socrates gets them to agree to further premises q and r

(3)   Both agree that q & r entail not-p

(4)   Socrates concludes that not-p is true, p is false

 

Vlastos gave several examples of step four found in the Gorgias. These were:

(1) that to teach men justice is to make them just (Gorgias 460A-c)

(2) that the good is not the pleasant and the pleasant is not the good and that pleasure should be pursued for the sake of the good, not vice versa (Gorgias 494E-500A)

(3) that it is better to suffer wrong than to commit it and to suffer deserved punishment than to escape it (the great argument in the Gorgias, made first against Polus and then, with different premises, against Callicles).[66] These conclusions are not examples of conclusions that fit the pattern that Vlastos said he identified in step four above. Step four as outlined above would result in conclusions such as p is false or not p is true. What Plato’s Socrates was looking for was p is true. Since he believed he had no real access to p, all he could talk about was not p. Vlastos was right that Socrates’ method involved a search, but he was incorrect in believing that the outcome of the search was the pure knowledge Plato’s Socrates sought. The character Socrates was portrayed as having true knowledge referred to as certain knowledge or knowledge C, when all he had were true beliefs. Vlastos’ view is no different that Irwin’s view that Socrates had true belief. Vlastos was not presenting a new position (when he claimed that in addition to true belief Socrates had knowledge) because when we look closer we can see that the knowledge he claimed Socrates had was not true knowledge, but merely belief.

If we do not divide the Platonic dialogues into those that are representative of “Socratic philosophy” and those that are Platonic philosophy, we are more likely to take each dialogue as a whole in order to come to a better understanding of the development of Plato’s philosophy. By viewing each dialogue as a whole, we are able to see changes in Plato’s philosophy. These changes are evident if we look at the dialogue to see:

(1)   What method of inquiry Plato had Socrates use (elenchus)?

(2)   How did Plato use an impasse to engage the reader and interlocutor in the philosophical search?

(3)   What definitions and theories if any were able to withstand scrutiny?

 

If while reading the dialogues, we become upset with Plato’s Socrates (as many did in various dialogues) and think to ourselves that he is not all that others have made him out to be, we are not yet the “pregnant” students he aimed to address. There are many examples of interlocutors who become upset with Plato’s Socrates in the dialogues, but in the Theaetetus this does not happen. Theaetetus recognized that his answers were not acceptable during his conversation with Socrates as soon as they were analyzed because they failed to meet the demands of logic.

Unlike the Theaetetus and the Meno, the Phaedo gave another method of gaining “knowledge” for Plato’s Socrates. Although Vlastos referred to a few of the passages in the Meno, in his book Socratic Studies, there was not much reference to the Theaetetus. This is because he has separated these as being three of the middle dialogues of Plato. As such they do not represent the ideas of Socrates according to Vlastos.[67]

If we do not apply the divisions, which Vlastos believed to be correct, we see the Theaetetus differently. In the dialogue the “fictional character” of Plato’s Socrates concluded in the Theaetetus that after a thorough inquiry he had not found an acceptable definition. We were taken through three possible definitions of knowledge. Each of the definitions had a problem and the search continued. The dialogue ended aporetically with no answer to what was an acceptable definition of knowledge.

We should not be so much concerned that Socrates thought this or Plato thought that. Instead we should think for ourselves about the ideas without thinking, for instance, if Socrates thought them, he must have been right.

 We are guided in the Theaetetus to seek a definition like that of clay. Instead of dividing clay into examples such as red clay, gray clay or black clay, Socrates starts with the statement that he is seeking a definition of a certain sort such as clay is earth and water. Once Plato’s Socrates was able to identify what all of one kind had in common, he had identified the form or the “one over many”. When he sought a definition of knowledge, he meant pure knowledge. He did not believe that he would be able to find pure knowledge while he was alive.

Another dialogue with many important concepts concerning knowledge is the Phaedo. If we are interested in discovering various ideas about what knowledge might be, we should discover if the author used the same method of inquiry in the Phaedo as he had in the Theaetetus and in the Meno. We should also look at how an impasse was used to pull the reader into the philosophical search and what philosophical views were able to withstand Socrates’ examination.

 In Chapter Three, I will look at the methods used by Plato’s Socrates in the Theaetetus, Meno and Phaedo and will discuss the use of impasse to gain the reader’s participation in a philosophical search. By looking at whether the definitions and theories are able to withstand the scrutiny of Plato’s Socrates, we are able to see Plato’s philosophical development. The outcome of his searches for an understanding of the nature of knowledge show that his disavowal of knowledge was not a ploy, but an actual claim based on his inability to define pure knowledge. Contrary to what Vlastos believed, it is incorrect to say that Socrates professed to have attained pure knowledge. It is more correct to say that the character in the Platonic dialogues known as “Plato’s Socrates” held many beliefs about pure knowledge that he thought were true beliefs.

Chapter 3 Meno, Theaetetus, Phaedo

 

In the Meno, Theaetetus and Phaedo three different groups of historical characters are given. In each of the dialogues Plato primarily used the elenctic method. Three different views are given by Plato concerning knowledge in the dialogues. Each dialogue has an impasse that represents various philosophical stages individuals go through. I will begin this section by analyzing the Meno in these areas.

Meno: Historical Characters

 

In the Meno, the character Meno was an actual member of the expedition of Cyrus mentioned by Xenophon[68] in Anabasis, while Anytus was a historical Athenian politician.[69] The time setting of this dialogue is approximately 402 B.C. and Plato’s actual writing of the dialogue is estimated to have been around 390 B.C.[70]

Method of Search

The Meno begins with the elenctic search for a definition of virtue. Like Theaetetus, Meno began with giving examples. He answered that:

T1 Meno 71e: “a man’s virtue consists of being able to manage public affairs and in so doing benefit his friends and harm his enemies and to be careful that no harm comes to himself; if you want the virtue of a woman, it is not difficult to describe: she must manage the home well, preserve its possessions, and be submissive to her husband; the virtue of a child, whether male or female, is different again, and so is that of an elderly man, if you want that, or if you want that of a free man or a slave.”

 

When a definition was not found they questioned whether or not virtue was teachable. The method of search was then changed. Plato had Socrates suggest that they use the hypothesis method of searching for the answer of whether or not virtue was teachable. (Meno 86e) Socrates and Meno were joined by Anytus who left soon after Socrates concluded that “virtue can certainly not be taught.”(Meno 94e) This conclusion went against the teachings of the sophists who claimed to be teaching their students to become virtuous. Like the Theaetetus, Plato had Socrates begin the Meno with a search for a definition. In the Meno the search was for a definition of virtue. Plato had Socrates begin the dialogue with the claim that he did not “have any knowledge of what virtue itself is.” (Meno 71a)[71]

View of Knowledge

The Theory of Recollection was espoused as an explanation of how one recalls what one knew previously before this life in the Meno. Plato’s Socrates explained to Meno in the dialogue that the soul is immortal and the importance of recollection. Before coming into our present existence, we knew all things according to this view. Most of the truths we knew were forgotten, so we spend our lives recalling what we once knew. This searching and recalling is what we call “learning” although Socrates claimed we are not learning, but recollecting. Plato’s Socrates used a slave to make his point. He gave the slave a geometry problem to show that he was not learning anything new but was recollecting. They begin with agreeing that a square is a figure in which all four sides are equal and that the lines through the middle are equal.[72] When they reached a point in which he slave did not know the answer to Socrates questions, Meno and Socrates agreed that he was better off then because he knew he does not know and would keep searching for an answer.[73]

In this view of knowledge, when we find knowledge it is because it was within ourselves. We are not taught by others but merely led in our search. Socrates concluded that those guided by knowledge “will always succeed”, while those guided by true belief or true opinion “will only succeed at times.”(Meno 97c) In the Meno, it is suggested that knowledge sometimes comes from true opinions. (Meno 86a) Once the problems involving circularity caused by “Daedalus” are corrected, true opinions are “tied down by (giving) an account of the reason why”[74] and these true opinions become knowledge. Socrates did not claim to have much knowledge though. He stated,

T2 Meno 98b:“I too speak as one who does not have knowledge but is guessing. However, I certainly do not think I am guessing that right opinion is a different thing from knowledge. If I claim to know anything else-and I would make that claim about few things-I would put this down as one of the things I know.”

 

Impasse

 

Plato portrays Meno’s slave as one who is beginning the search for knowledge once he is aware that he lacks answers to something that is a puzzle to him. This impasse is the driving force behind his desire to know what he does not know. This is of interest because it is meant to show the awakening of the philosophical spirit at the beginning of a search for knowledge.

 

Theaetetus

 

Historical Characters

 

It is known that Theaetetus and Theodorus were historical geometricians in Plato’s time so it is possible that Plato actually encountered these men. It is not necessarily true that all that was said concerning the men and their accomplishments were true. There is much debate concerning whether or not the theory of incommensurability that was mentioned in Theaetetus was developed during this time or if they were Pre-Platonic discoveries.[75]

 

Method of Search

            The Theaetetus is Plato’s in-depth attempt to discover the nature of knowledge using the elenchus method. Sixteen-year-old Theaetetus was asked to define knowledge at the beginning of the dialogue. In his first answer, Theaetetus claimed that knowledge was:

 

T3 Theaetetus 146c-147c: “the things one might learn from Theodorus-geometry, and the subjects…< astronomy, calculation, music> are kinds of knowledge; and also that the arts of the shoemaker and the other craftsmen, all together and each individual one of them, are knowledge and nothing else.”

 

Socrates replied that these were examples of kinds of knowledge, but he wanted a definition such as clay is earth and water. Theaetetus understood what Socrates was talking about and referred to a similar problem he and Theodorus had searching for a word that would cover all the powers of a certain kind. Earlier Theodorus and Theaetetus had:

 T4 Theaetetus 147e-148b: “divided all the numbers into two sorts. If a number can be obtained by multiplying some number by itself, we compared it to what’s square in shape, and called it square and equal sided…But if a number comes in between-these include three and five, and in fact any number which can’t be obtained by multiplying a number by itself, but is obtained by multiplying a larger number by a smaller or a smaller by a larger, so that the sides containing it are always longer and shorter-we compared it to an oblong shape, and called it an oblong number…We defined all the lines that square off equal-sided numbers on plane surfaces as lengths, and all the lines that square off oblong numbers as powers, since they aren’t commensurable with the first sort in length, but only in respect of the plane figures which they have the power to form.”

 

Theaetetus tried a second time to define knowledge for Socrates. At 151e he stated,  “knowledge is nothing but perception.” This view was refuted also. Another attempt at defining knowledge is made at Theaetetus 187a­-201c. He cautiously made the suggestion that “perhaps true judgement is knowledge.”[76] This was also refuted and a final attempt was made at 201c-210a to find a definition of knowledge. Theaetetus had remembered someone had told him that “true judgement with an account is knowledge”.[77] This definition was also rejected even after specifying that an account must be:

(i)                  Verbal expression of thought

(ii)                Enumeration of the elements

(iii)               distinguishing formula[78]

 

 

 

View of Knowledge

 

No acceptable definition of “knowledge” was found in the Theaetetus. No mention of the Meno’s Theory of Recollection was made in the Theaetetus. There are similarities in the various dialogues. We can conclude that Plato’s Socrates believed that the search for definitions was important in the search for knowledge. In addition, by becoming aware of our limitations in finding acceptable answers, Plato’s Socrates concluded that we are benefited. The Theaetetus ends with Socrates telling Theaetetus that Theaetetus had “the sense not to think you know things which in fact you don’t know.” Theaetetus 210c5.

I think it is necessary to differentiate between this kind of “knowing” and the kinds of knowing that Vlastos differentiated. Vlastos divided “knowing” into Knowledge C and Knowledge E. When “knowing” involves beliefs in God or gods, “knowledge” is more accurately identified as a belief or opinion. It would be more in line with Vlastos’style of identifying the different uses of the word “knowledge” to use “knowledge B” to indicate beliefs that are so convicting or convincing that they seem like they are infallible and therefore known to be true by those who hold the belief.

Differentiating between the various kinds of what seems to be knowledge does not accomplish what Plato’s Socrates set out to do in the Theaetetus when he sought for a definition though. He did not want examples of knowledge or examples of what seemed to be knowledge. He wanted a definition that would fully explain what knowledge was without the use of examples.

 

Impasse

 

After three attempts at defining knowledge in the Theaetetus, Socrates and Theodorus and Theaetetus admitted they had not succeeded.[79] Although it can be argued that the reason a definition was not found was that they did not search long enough, it is also possible that no answers nor definitions would have satisfied Plato’s Socrates. In the Theaetetus, the geometers had tried to work out calculations that would aid in their theory of incommensurables, but met an impasse. This did not stop their search though. A possible explanation of J. H. Anderhub stating why Theaetetus and Theodorus may have stopped their calculations with sides of seventeen square feet is found in van der Waerden’s  book. See monograph in Appendix B. These impasses show the persistence of the philosophical spirit in the midst of a search for knowledge.

 

Phaedo

Historical Characters

Many historical characters are mentioned in the Phaedo as those in attendance at the death of Socrates. These include many who were identified by Charles Kahn as Socratic writers such as: Phaedo (former prostitute turned philosopher), Aeschines, Antisthenes, and Euclides from Megara. Other historical characters present were: Echecrates, Apllodorus, Critoboulos, Hermogenes, Epigenes, Ctesippus of Paeane, Menexenus, Simmias from Thebes, Cebes, Phaidondes, Terpsion from Megara.

 

Method of Search

 

In the Phaedo, it is not the answers, but the questions that are important. In a conversation with Simmas at Socrates deathbed, Socrates asks several questions:

T6 Phaedo 65b: Is the body an obstacle when one associates with it in the search for knowledge?…

Does the soul grasp the truth?

For whenever it attempts to examine anything with the body, it is clearly deceived by it.

Is it not in reasoning if anywhere that any reality becomes clear to the soul? And indeed the soul reasons best when none of these senses troubles it, neither hearing nor sight, nor pain nor pleasure, but when it is most by itself, taking leave of the body and as far as possible having no contact or association with it in its search for reality.

And it is then that the soul of the philosopher most disdains the body, flees from it and seeks to be by itself?

Do we say that there is such a thing as the Just itself, or not?..And the Beautiful and the Good?

And have you ever seen any of these things with your eyes?

Or have you ever grasped them with any of your bodily senses?

View of Knowledge

 

Plato’s Socrates, as portrayed in the Phaedo, had the assurance that the answers that he sought as a philosopher could be found once his soul was freed from the body. His expectations were that he would:

T7 Phaedo 63b: “go first to other wise and good gods, then to men who have died and are better than men here. Be assured that, as it is, I expect to join the company of good men…I have good hope that some future awaits men after death, as we have been told for years, a much better future for the good than for the wicked.”

            Plato had Socrates convince the others that knowledge was recollected and made reference to the theory of recollection that was made in the Meno. More emphasis is made on Plato’s portrayal of Socrates as one who believed that the underworld held the answers he had sought all his life.

 

Impasse

 

If we are to look at the Phaedo as Plato’s portrayal of the character Socrates at the end of his life as a philosopher, we can not help but to see the expectation of finally finding answers to the questions that had puzzled him for years. This shows the anticipation of the philosophical spirit at the brink of discovery in their search for knowledge. He has the assurance that his guesses or hypotheses are correct regardless of what others think. Socrates believed that the impasses caused by the limitations on Socrates in this world would surely be removed once his soul was freed from his body.

Plato portrays Meno’s slave as one who is beginning the search for knowledge once he is aware that he lacks answers to something that is a puzzle to him. This impasse is the driving force behind his desire to know what he does not know. This is of interest because it is meant to show the awakening of the philosophical spirit at the beginning of a search for knowledge.

 

 

Chapter Four: Conclusion

 

The Meno, Theaetetus and Phaedo have different characters and different philosophical views concerning knowledge.  If we view these as dialogues that reflect Plato’s philosophical development, we can account for differences in views that result from changes through the years. Although it is helpful to know when the dialogues were written and in what order, it is not absolutely necessary in order to notice changes in philosophical views. In each of the dialogues Socrates denies having pure knowledge. Some have taken this disavowal of knowledge to be a ploy, but I think Plato had Socrates take this stance so as to represent one who is beginning a philosophical search for something that is not attainable until the soul is separated from the confines of the body. This is consistent with Gulley’s view that by professing ignorance Socrates was able to encourage others to seek out the truth. Since Plato through Socrates often referred to pure knowledge and repeatedly disclaimed that he had knowledge, I agree with Irwin that these disclaimers are “too frequent and emphatic to be dismissed as ironical without strong reason.” [80]

By ironic, Vlastos means “a figure of speech in which something contrary to what is said is to be understood”.[81] Vlastos took Socrates claims that he had no knowledge to be ironic because Vlastos misunderstood the kind of knowledge Plato through Socrates was referring to when he spoke of pure knowledge. Vlastos took the passage from the Apology to be evidence that Plato had pure knowledge, but this passage merely shows how our strong beliefs tend to seem like they are infallible. When Plato had the character Socrates draw people out and get them to expound on their ideas, it was to show them an impasse in their thinking. Ideally when these impasses were encountered, the interlocutors intellectual curiosity would cause them to seek answers to overcome the impasses. Those who were encouraged to try to find answers to their difficulties were open to new directions.

I do not think that it is the character Socrates that “draws out” the various characters in the dialog, but the impasse. When the interlocutor or the reader acknowledges an impasse, the impasse prompts their desire to find infallible answers or to know. Vlastos misses this in his argument and claims that:

(1)                           it is the philosophy of the historical Socrates, not Plato that the so-called “Socratic dialogues”.

(2)                           Apology 29B6-7 is evidence historical Socrates had knowledge

Therefore, the historical Socrates’ is ironic and meant the opposite of what he said when he claimed that he had no knowledge. The historical Socrates used his disavowal of knowledge to draw others into the search for pure knowledge that was possible to obtain.

Since this argument is based on false premises, it is not sound. The premise that some of Plato’s dialogues are “Socratic dialogues” is false because  the dialogues were written by Plato. I think it is better to view the Platonic dialogues as separate discourses containing various philosophical views that may or may not have ideas in common with the other dialogues. The Platonic dialogues, as an example of the Socratic genre style of writing, often involve historical characters and events that add to the artistic illusion that the characters were actually engaged in a philosophical conversation with the historical Socrates. I think that this was Plato’s literary genius at work. The Platonic dialogues were the product of Plato’s mind. When one attributes Plato’s ideas to Socrates, one fails to give credit to the author. Spending years thinking about the problems that were prevalent in Plato’s time while associating himself with scholars, philosophers, mathematicians enabled Plato to develop his ideas in various areas over his lifetime. Just as the Theaetetus, Meno and Phaedo show three different views of knowledge, they show three different examples of Plato writing in the Socratic genre.

To interpret Apology 29B6-7 as evidence enough to say the historical Socrates had pure knowledge, builds on the unfounded claim that the dialogues accurately expound the views of the historical Socrates. Even if the views were of the historical Socrates, as Vlastos claims, the passage at Apology 29B6-7 would    hardly be enough to justify the statement that Socrates had knowledge. Not only is it one passage out of thousands, but it is not concerning the “pure knowledge” which is the goal of these philosophical searches.

These searches were usually thwarted by an impasse that would force those involved in the search to seek new directions. I think for Vlastos to discard the passages where Plato has the character Socrates disavow knowledge by claiming Socrates was an ironist was a mistake. The claim that he only said this to pull others into a philosophical search is unfounded. To attempt to flatter an interlocutor by pretending to be dumb is out of character for Plato’s Socrates. He did not need to draw curious interlocutor’s in. When one pretends to be dumb, they flatter the others who think they know something the pretender does not know. This pretense and flattery is not consistent with Plato’s Socrates who criticizes such flattery. Philosophers are distinguishes from others from the lack of flattery in their speech. If we take flattery to be the archaic definition similar to beguile, we see that if Socrates would have pretended to be ignorant to draw other into the conversations, he would be trying as the definition states, “ to encourage or gratify especially with the assurance that something <someone> is right”.[82]

Instead of viewing Socrates as being responsible for drawing interlocutors into philosophical searches, I think that it is the impasse that draws them. When the interlocutor becomes aware of the impasse, they react by either being either getting out of the conversation or by trying a new direction.

This is similar to one trying to put a puzzle together, only to find a piece does not fit. One could give up or keep trying to find a way for it to fit. We can imagine the puzzle to be so difficult that it might seem be impossible for the piece to fit, but one does not give up. Although many may think that one who would spend their life trying to find answers to questions to the impasses encountered are wasting their time, I think they should be encouraged to continue their search. By taking the time to think about these impasses, one distinguishes oneself as a philosopher instead of one full of answers like a slave to flattering speech.

 

 There are the two types, Theodorus. There is the one who has been brought up in true freedom and leisure, whom you call a philosopher; to whom it is no disgrace to appear simple and good-for-nothing when confronted with menial tasks, for instance, how to make a bed, or how to sweeten a sauce or a flattering speech. Then you have the other[83], the one who is keen and smart at doing all of these jobs, but does not know how to strike up a song in turn like a free man, or how to tune the strings of common speech to the fitting praise of the life of gods and of the happy among men.

-Socrates, Theaetetus 175d-176a[84]
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http://www-history.mcs.st-andrews.ac.uk/history/References/Theaetetus.html

 

http://www.swan.ac.uk/classics/staff/ter/grst/big.htm#Theaitetos

 

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0171&query=head%3D%232

 

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/perscoll?collection=Perseus:collection:PersInfo

 

http://www.grtbooks.com/lng_grk.html

 

http://phd.evansville.edu//tetralog.htm

 

http://members.aol.com/jeff570/geometry.html

 

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http://ios.org/pubs/F_phimat.asp

 

http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/perscoll?collection=Perseus%3Acollection%3ADDBDP&type=Any&lang=greek&lookup=&.submit=Change

 

http://www.shef.ac.uk/uni/projects/ptpdlp/questions/feedback/feedback.html

 

http://jupiter.phy.ohiou.edu/Departments/Philo/graduate.html

 

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http://philosophy.ohio-state.edu/

 

http://www.math.ohiou.edu/math/

 

http://www.math.ohio-state.edu/Graduate/index.html

 

http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?eu=73825&tocid=0

 

http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?eu=118175&tocid=65979

 

http://www.britannica.com/frm_redir.jsp?query=theaetetus&redir=http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/theatu.html

 

www.m-w.com

 

 

 

 

Appendix A  

Reprinted with publisher’s permission. B.L. van der Waerden Science Awakening :Egyptian, Babylonian and Greek Mathematics
                The chart on the previous page shows the chronological History of Greek Mathematics from approximately 600 B.C. to 400 A.D.  If we look at the division of Greek philosophers and mathematicians during this thousand-year period, we can see that it was not uncommon for philosophers to also be mathematicians in the earlier years. This can be seen by Thales and Anaximander being listed under the category of Greek Philosophers/Historians and then in the category of Greek Mathematicians/Astronomers. During the next hundred years only Anaxagoras is listed under both categories in the chart. This chart also shows several mathematicians who were around during Plato’s time including the characters in the Theaetetus Theodorus (430B.C.) and Theaetetus (390B.C.)

            Although there may not be many Greek philosophers who are also mathematicians in modern Greece, there are many philosophers who are also mathematicians in 2001. As we question Euclidean geometry, space, time, spacetime, space travel, artificial intelligence, computers and other problems, we can see the interdependence of the various philosophies: philosophy of mathematics, science, logic, metaphysics, epistemology and their importance in understanding the history of Greek and modern philosophy. We should ensure that the youth of today are educated in traditional Greek studies such as: mathematics, astronomy, and logic. Plato wanted students outside of the Academy to have access to his writings. We should learn from his example. Since the brightest students are not always found among the richest, we should see that those who have high intelligence are educated in various theories and given the opportunity to develop to their full potential as philosophers…. but that is another paper for another time.

 

Appendix B Monograph: Impasse

 

J.H. Anderhub’s monograph showing why he thought Theodorus and Theaetetus stopped at a square with sides having 17 feet from Figure 47 from B.L. van der Waerden’s Science Awakening.  See Joco-Seria’s Aus den Papieren eines reisenden Kaufmannes,Ausgabe der Kalle-Warke,Wiesbden,1941.

 


Notes

 [1] Gregory Vlastos, “Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 39.

     [2] For more on this view see Norman Gulley, The Philosophy of Socrates (New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1968).

     [3] See Terence Irwin, Plato’s Moral Theory: The Early and Middle Dialogues (New York: Clarendon Press) 1977.

     [4] Gulley 69

     [5] Irwin 39-40

      [6] Vlastos argued that the method known as elenchus was Socrates’ only access to moral knowledge. See Vlastos, “Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 61fn50.

     [7] Vlastos, “Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 50.

     [8] For entire collection of Plato’s works see: Plato,  The Collected Dialogues of Plato Including the Letters Eds. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961)

     [9] Vlastos, “Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 49.

     [10] Vlastos, “Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 50-55.

     [11] Vlastos, “Socratic Elenchus: Method is All,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 4.

     [12] Vlastos, “Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 62.

     [13] Vlastos, “Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 55,63.

     [14] Vlastos favors the position found in the middle of the Republic instead of the Meno. Vlastos, “Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 53. In the Meno Plato “borrows from the geometricians the ‘hypothetical method of investigation’.” Vlastos, “Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 53 fn35.

     [15] Vlastos, “Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 54.

     [16] Vlastos, “Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 63.

     [17] See Vlastos’ article “Elenchus and Mathematics: A Turning Point in Plato’s Philosophical Development,” in Hugh Benson, Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) 137.

     [18] Vlastos, “Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 58.

     [19] Vlastos, “Socratic Elenchus: Method is All,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 2.

     [20] Vlastos, “Notes,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 136.

     [21] Vlastos, “Socratic Elenchus: Method is All,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 2.

     [22] Vlastos, “Socratic Elenchus: Method is All,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 2.

     [23] Vlastos, “Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 58fn45.

     [24] See Vlastos’ article “Elenchus and Mathematics: A Turning Point in Plato’s Philosophical Development,” in Hugh Benson, Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) 148.

     [25] See Vlastos’ article “Elenchus and Mathematics: A Turning Point in Plato’s Philosophical Development,” in Hugh Benson, Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) 149.

     [26] In the Theaetetus, Theodorus’ best geometry student (Theaetetus) is chosen to join him in an attempt to find a definition of  “knowledge”.

     [27] See Vlastos, Platonic Studies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981)

     [28] See Vlastos’ “Is the Socratic Fallacy Socratic?,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 67-86.

     [29] Vlastos, “Is the Socratic Fallacy Socratic?,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 84.

     [30] Vlastos, “Is the Socratic Fallacy Socratic?,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 69fn6.

     [31] www.m-w.com

     [32] Vlastos, “Is the Socratic Fallacy Socratic?,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 79.

     [33] Vlastos, “Socratic Elenchus: Method is All,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 29n.

     [34] Vlastos, ““Historical Socrates and Athenian Democracy,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 104n.

     [35] Vlastos, “Socratic Elenchus: Method is All,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 6n.

     [36] Vlastos, “Socratic Elenchus: Method is All,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 5n.

     [37] Vlastos, “Socratic Elenchus: Method is All,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 5n.

     [38] Vlastos, “Is the Socratic Fallacy Socratic?,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 84.

     [39] Vlastos, “Is the Socratic Fallacy Socratic?,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 82.

     [40] www.m-w.com

     [41] Vlastos, “Is the Socratic Fallacy Socratic?,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 84.

     [42] See Vlastos’ article “Elenchus and Mathematics: A Turning Point in Plato’s Philosophical Development,” in Hugh Benson, Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) 138.

     [43] Vlastos, “Socratic Elenchus: Method is All,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 7.

     [44] Vlastos, “Notes,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) Vlastos noted that he believed the chronological order of Plato’s works could be ascertained. The middle dialogues were:   “Cratylus, Phaedo, Symposium, Republic II-X, Phaedrus, Parmenides and Theaetetus.” The Meno was a transition work from earlier to middle dialogues. See page 135 for reasons for various chronological orderings of the dialogues.

     [45] Vlastos, “Socrates’ Disavowal of Knowledge,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 50fn27.

     [46] See ordering of the dialogues and reasons for the order argued in Vlastos’ Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1991).

     [47] Critical group was referred to Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman in 1950. These dialogues were seen as a group which had so much in common, that many philosophers used the group to determine if the other dialogues were probably written before or after this group. See W.K.C. Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) 5: 1.

     [48]Middle period included only Parmenides, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Republic, Symposium and Theaetetus due to stylometrics, which Crombie believed to be the most accurate method of dividing the dialogues. Sophist and Statesman were seen as two of the late dialogues. For more on stylometrics see I.M. Crombie,  “The Development of Plato’s Thought,” An Examination of Plato’s Doctrines 2 vols. (New York: Humanities Press, 1969) 2: 9-11.

     [49] The Theaetetus, which will be referred to repeatedly in this paper, was guessed by most at the time of the publication of Guthrie’s book to have been written in 369/7 B.C.  For more on the debate concerning possible date of when it was written see W.K.C. Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) 5: 61. Guthrie refers to the dramatic date of the Theaetetus as 399. W.K.C. Guthrie, History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) 5: 63

     [50] See Alfred Edward Taylor, Plato: The Man and His Work (London: Methuen, 1966) for the examples of this. A few of these examples (Protagoras was dated to take place before Protagoras was born and three dialogues: Republic, Gorgias, and Symposium would have taken place before Plato was a teenager) are mentioned in Kenneth Sayre,  “Why Plato Wrote Dialogues,” Plato’s Literary Garden  (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995) 3.

     [51]See argument against the idea that Plato wrote the dialogues to preserve the memory of the historical Socrates by Kahn “Did Plato Write the Socratic Dialogues?,” in Hugh Benson, Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) 35-52. For arguments against the idea that Plato was a record keeper of Socrates’ conversations see Kenneth Sayre, Plato’s Literary Garden  (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995) 3-5.

     [52] Charles H. Kahn, “The Socratic Literature,” Plato and the Socratic Dialogues : the Philosophical Use of a Literary Form (Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 1-35.

     [53] Kahn, “The Socratic Literature,” Plato and the Socratic Dialogues: the Philosophical Use of a Literary Form  (Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 3.

     [54] Kenneth Sayre, Plato’s Literary Garden (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995) 4.

     [55] Kenneth Sayre, Plato’s Literary Garden (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995) 31.

     [56] See B.L. van der Waerden, Science Awakening, trans. Arnold Dresden, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1963) 24.

     [57] See B.L. van der Waerden, Science Awakening, trans. Arnold Dresden, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1963) 141.

     [58] Vlastos, “Notes,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 135.

     [59] Vlastos, “Notes,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 135.

     [60] See Plato, “Euthyphro,” Five Dialogues, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981), 5-22.

     [61] Socrates admitted his kinship to the mythological Daedalus who made such life-like statues that they appeared to be real enough to move and responded that he (Socrates) must be even more clever because he was able to move things that were made by others too according to Euthyphro’s claim. See Plato, “Euthyphro,” Five Dialogues, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981), 16.

     [62] One conclusion reached was that “pious action is god-loved because it is pious, not pious because it is god-loved (Euthyphro 9D-11A) See other conclusions from Platonic dialogues in Vlastos, “Socratic Elenchus,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 12.

     [63] See Martin McAvoy, The Profession of Ignorance: with Constant Reference to Socrates (Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 1999).

     [64] Vlastos, “Socratic Elenchus: Method is All,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 4.

     [65] Vlastos, “Socratic Elenchus: Method is All,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 11.

     [66] Vlastos, “Socratic Elenchus: Method is All,” Socratic Studies Ed. Myles Burnyeat (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) 12.

     [67] See Vlastos, Platonic Studies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981) for Vlastos writings concerning among other topics, Plato’s Social Philosophy.

     [68] Charles H. Kahn, “The Socratic Literature,” Plato and the Socratic Dialogues : the Philosophical Use of a Literary Form (Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 29-35. Xenophon was one of the later of the Socratic writers (Alexamenos of Teos, Antisthenes, Aeschines, Phaedo, Eucleides, Plato, Aristippus) mentioned by Charles Kahn.

     [69] See Plato, “Meno,” Five Dialogues, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981), 57.

     [70] Plato, “Meno,” Five Dialogues, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981), 57.

     [71] This was contrary to what Vlastos believed. He argued that the statement found in Apology was sufficient enough to argue that Socrates in fact had knowledge of virtue. Vlastos based this on:

 Apology 29B6-7: “…but that to do injustice and disobey my superior, god or man, this I know to be evil and base.”

     [72] When I read through this dialogue it seemed to me that the lines through the middle could be diagonals, so unless a diagram was made for the slave during this conversation, he could have thought of the example using diagonals resulting in four triangles which were individually equal to one square when doubled.

     [73] They are able to take their example up to a sixteen-foot square. Compare to Plato, Theaetetus, trans. John McDowell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).

     [74] Plato, “Meno,” Five Dialogues trans. G.M.A. Grube (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981) 86.

     [75] See W.R. Knorr, “Plato’s Account of Theodorus,” The Evolution of Euclidean Elements: A Study of the Theory of Incommensurable Magnitudes and Its Significance for Early Greek Geometry : (Dordrecht, Holland; Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1975)  86.

     [76] Plato, Theaetetus, trans. John McDowell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973) 187b5.

     [77] Plato, Theaetetus, trans. John McDowell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973) 201d.

     [78] Plato, “Notes,” Theaetetus, trans. John McDowell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973) 257.

     [79] Waerden, B.L.van der. Science Awakening: Egyptian, Babylonian and Greek

Mathematics. Trans. Arnold Dresden. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.) 1963. van

der Waerden incorrectly refers to Euclid’s influence on Theodorus and Theaetetus.

[80] Irwin 39-40

[81] Gregory Vlastos. Socrates, Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Ithaca: Cornell University Press) 1991.

[82] www.m-w.com

     [83] Gene Fendt and David Rozema believed that people who made it their profession to determine what other philosopher’s believed were in this category in which they included: F.M. Cornford (1935), Kenneth M. Sayre (1969) Nicholas White (1976), David Bostock (1988) Myles Burnyeat (1990), Ronald Polansky (1992) See Gene Fendt and David Rozema, “What to do with an Honors Student,” Platonic Errors: Plato, A Kind of A Poet (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1998) 125n2.

     [84] Paraphrased translation of quote from Theaetetus in Gene Fendt and David Rozema, “What to do with an Honors Student,”. Platonic Errors: Plato, A Kind of A Poet  (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1998) 108.