In July 1999 the Hizbollah spokesperson and Press Attaché Ibrahim Mussawi agreed to meet journalism students from Ohio University to talk to them about Hizbollah’s philosophy and answer their questions. This was an unprecedented move, a gesture of good faith by an otherwise highly security conscious organization. We drove right up to the Hizbollah party office in West Beirut and were served tea by Hizbollah volunteers while we waited for the interview to begin. 

At the very outset, the gesture in itself pointed towards Hizbollah’s changing attitudes. Ibrahim Mussawi, unlike Hizbollah office bearers before him, claims that he graduated with a degree in Journalism from Lebanese University in 1989. He returned to enroll in a Masters’ program of graduate study in Communication and International Relations at the American University of Beirut. Earlier Hizbollah leaders would have concentrated mostly on studies in Shia theology. The effort, thus, exists among the Hizbollah cadre themselves to learn more about the world around them. 

The first sign of this ‘changed world cognition’ is the rolling back of the erstwhile Hizbollah agenda to establish an Islamic Lebanese state and destroy Israel. "We know we can not have an Islamic republic in Lebanon," offer Mussawi , "We always knew that. It just is not possible in a country with 18 different sects. But we continue to believe in Islam and the way of Islam." The agenda, then, has shifted within the Hizbollah to uphold the Islamic way of life as an exemplary one, without expecting a total metamorphosis of the state structure itself. 

"We won’t disassociate from our religion ever," asserts Mussawi, "But our political agenda is national reform - both economic and political reform. We want to create a state of equal opportunity and justice for all and do away with the circles of influence."

The Hizbollah movement has also moved on to political empowerment as a means of achieving social and religious goals rather than revolutionary, violent struggle. "We were never a part of the civil war," contends Mussawi in a attempt to gloss over the ferocious clashes between the Hizbollah, Amal and Syrian troops. "We were only fighting the occupation armies," he claims but then becomes more candid during cross-questioning. "We had clashes with Amal for three years till 1989," he admits, "But then we made a clear cut decision not to have any internal disputes. The first priority for Hizbollah is fighting and removing the occupation (IDF). Amal is more active in politics and we have good relations with Amal, we meet to work out our differences and disputes. It is like two brothers living in the same house."

In this sanitized version of the story Hizbollah has, nevertheless, progressed from victory on the battlefield to victory in the ballots. "People ask me how come Hizbollah has changed from revolutionary to evolutionary, from military to politics," muses Mussawi, "But there has been no change. This is a process of maturity. Before 1992 we never had the option of a political process so how could we have been a political party? It was in 1992 that people asked us to participate in the elections and so we did. In 1992 we had 12 seats in parliament, in 1996 we had 6 but this was not a loss of support but rather a question of representation under the election law."

In the 1996 elections Syria is said to have brokered Amal and Hizbollah feuds and dictated political seat sharing and divisions which hurt Hizbollah. Mussawi refuses to admit to the larger role of Syria and Iran in the fortunes of the Hizbollah, referring to them mostly as "allies in resistance against Israel." 

"Hizbollah is fully independent and autonomous," says Mussawi, "We take no directions from anyone. Syria respects and believes in Hizbollah, we receive Syrian support. Iran supports us as it believes that what Hizbollah is doing is right. But we do not take orders or directions."

On the question of a possible support of Palestinians, Mussawi refuses to commit on anything besides humanitarian assistance towards Palestinians refugees in Lebanese camps. "The Palestinian issue is a human issue," explains Mussawi, "It is a case of oppression and tyranny against a people. As human beings we have to help them. U.S. and Russia don’t give a damn, but there are no chosen people for God. Is God sectarian? Therefore we have to condemn oppression and sympathize with the oppressed." 

But what if the proposed `final settlement’ between Israel and Arafat’s Palestinian Authority refuses Palestinian refugees in Lebanon permission to return to Palestinian territory? "We support the Palestinians right to go back to their homes," says Mussawi, "And we will help them in any way to go back."

The Hizbollah’s short term goal remains that of pushing back the IDF and totally destroying the de-facto Israeli forces such as the SLA and the GSS (General Security Services - Mossad trained intelligence arm in Lebanon). Mussawi claims the Hizbollah’s war will be waged "till Israel hold one square inch of Lebanese territory." However what happens after Israel leaves is open to speculation and Mussawi will not confirm that Hizbollah will cease-fire and disarm.

"What will happen then is something we will announce at that particular time," says Mussawi, "They (Israelis) don’t say what their immediate plans are, so why should we? What we do next is our secret just as they have their secrets."

Shia fundamentalism has historically proven to flourish under crises and oppression. A peace treaty between Israel, Syria, Lebanon and the P.L.O. would leave the Shia with no immediate enemy to galvanize their energies and also isolate Iran in the Middle East. This could present two possible scenarios - Radicals in Iran could seek a militant isolationist confrontation with Israel and a section of the Hizbollah would respond in favor of this and drag south Lebanon into another war with Israel. Or, Iran could leave Israel alone, and then the Hizbollah would have to look inwards, within Lebanon, to seek a cause to mobilize their forces. The cause, given the present scenario, would be the lack of social justice and unbalanced power sharing in Lebanon.

 Professor Sammak admits that social justice does not rank high among the current Lebanese government’s priorities. However, he argues, there is a reason behind the studied ignorance of certain Lebanese communities. "Where there is complete truth there is no peace," claims Sammak, "Seeking perfect justice is not compatible with peace. Peace is built on many compromises."

Most of these compromises, argue Hizbollah leaders, have been made by the Shia community, who have yet to receive all the benefits of this peace.

The other ignored and compromised community in Lebanon is the Palestinian refugees. The most prominent lie about the Lebanese civil war is that it was orchestrated by Palestinian activity in Lebanon alone. In propagating this absurd half-truth, some Lebanese seem to deny themselves the understanding and compassion required to heal the wounds of the civil war. The Lebanese government, and a substantial portion of the Lebanese gentry, believes that isolating and weakening the Palestinian refugee community strengthens the security of Lebanon. 

In reality the Lebanese are opening themselves to a further lack of stability, especially when this cynical attitude towards the Palestinian refugees is accompanied by a lack of vigor in addressing the inadequacies of a pseudo-democratic confessional system of government that continues to under-represent a section of its population - namely the Shia. This studied frustration among the Palestinians and the Shia looks dangerously similar to the frustrations that brought these two communities together twenty years back. 

 As in 1975, Lebanese nationalism remains a confused concept. In July 1999, Druze Progressive Socialist Party leader, Walid Jumblatt, accused the appointed members of the cabinet of being unpatriotic. "How can they be true patriots," argued Jumblatt, "when not one of them took part in the Lebanese war?" 

Mr. Jumblatt conveniently forgot to mention the fact that the ‘Lebanese war’ was in fact a civil war. Can warlords, busy with protecting their little fiefdoms, and engaged in the bloody slaughter of their opposing community really be considered patriots? To many dissatisfied minority communities in Lebanon, ‘Lebanese nationalism’ means the preservation of the non-Arab, non-Muslim culture in Lebanon, which in highly cynical terms means denying the Lebanese Shia their legitimate share of representation in governance.

 "Lebanon has a unique democracy which is compatible to its issues," argues Professor Sammak. "Taif was an agreement brokered by Saudi Arabia, Algeria and Morocco," he explains, "The three are all Islamic states, but still the agreement accepted a Christian President and gave 50% of the share of political power to Christians in parliament and in the cabinet. The Lebanese democracy is designed to safeguard national unity. It is not one man, one vote. It is not a perfect text book democracy."

There is, nevertheless, considerable pressure within Lebanon to reform the post-Taif constitution to take into account actual populations of the constituencies. This is going to be a difficult task as the Lebanese government has not conducted a reliable census in over thirty years. Predictably, the census would identify the Shia as the numerical majority in Lebanon.

Currently the Syrian meddling ensures an even split in Shia support between the Amal and Hizbollah, and curtails the political ambitions of the both organizations. But will the Shia community tolerate this slight, especially once it has been freed of its burden of combating the IDF in the south in a post-Israeli withdrawal scenario?

After traveling to villages along the Israeli occupied southern corridor and visiting the United Nations’ peacekeeping battalions it became apparent to me that there existed many Lebanons within Lebanon. One Lebanon was that occupied and controlled by Syrian troops, with cabinet members in the government being hand picked by Syrian authorities. Here existed a degree of stability and people spoke of progress and development. 

Another Lebanon festered in the refugee camps, where Palestinians were left to fend for themselves with Syrian troops standing guard at camp gates to ensure ‘peace’ between the Palestinian militia and the Lebanese army. Here Kalashnikov rifles lay ready, propped behind office doors of the various Palestinian factions, and people spoke of discontent and disillusionment. 

Then there was yet another Lebanon, which was bombed regularly by Israeli artillery and where young children were often victims of indiscriminate Israeli sniper fire. Here people spoke of martyrs and ‘the eternal struggle,’ and dressed in black during mass street processions to commemorate the passing away of another son. 

It has been argued by some academics in Lebanon that Shia fundamentalism will not survive a peace with Israel - thereby insinuating that the role of the Hizbollah will be greatly watered down as a result of peace between Syria, Lebanon, the PLO and Israel. If the future in the political arena holds no great promise for the Hizbollah then the question is, will the organization continue to tone down its radical Islamist agenda, or will it do an about face and revert to extremist ideology? 

Academics, journalists and peacekeepers agree that some influence on the future of Hizbollah will come from the nature of the role that Syria will play in a post-peace agreement Lebanon. If Syria continues to assure peace with Israel through a policy of non-confrontation in Lebanon then it can effectively choke the Hizbollah’s supply line, which largely runs through Syrian borders. 

On the other hand, Syria may continue to support some form of Shia fundamentalism in order to check the growth of the Lebanese Sunni Ikhwan (Muslim Brotherhood). This is primarily for reasons of checking threats to the Assad controlled Ba’ath structure from Syrian Sunni radicals who have organized themselves in Lebanon in the past. But the balancing act between accommodating Israel and checking the growth of Sunni fundamentalists could well be achieved by keeping the Hizbollah at a minimum threat level. 

Syria also directly influences the future of Palestinian refugees who pose no great threat to the power structure in Syria, but being largely Sunni may well upset the delicate balance between the Shia and Sunni communities in Lebanon if they are given Lebanese citizenship. Once again, the nature of Syrian commitment to the Israel-PLO peace deal will dictate how much pressure Syria will put on controlling anti-Arafat elements in Lebanese refugee camps. 

Will a dissatisfied Shia Hizbollah militia form a union with a dissatisfied Sunni Palestinian refugee militia? And will this union resort to a campaign of violence against Israel? The answer to this question, currently, is an overwhelming no. However, the future of peace in the region also lies with developments in Iran. The Hizbollah that had sought spiritual guidance, as per Shia norms, from Ayatollah Khomeini, had declared its war against the Zionist entity and had its eyes on the liberation of not only South Lebanon but the entire land of Palestine. The Hizbollah that now seeks guidance from Ayatollah Khameini has had to curtail its ambitions and give up its claim to Jerusalem. This goes along with the moderation of post-Khomeini Iranian politics that seeks to normalize relations with the West. As recent student riots (July 1999) in Iran demonstrated, the balance between the moderates and the radicals in Iran is a difficult one. If it tips, then the balance between the moderates and radicals in Hizbollah will tip too. 

The current standpoint of the Hizbollah is one of cooperation with the Lebanese and Syrian governments. In the crowded suburbs of West Beirut, residents were mildly shocked to see a van full of foreigners ask for directions to the ‘secret’ office of the Hizbollah. The local joke is that the office is secret only to the CIA and the Mossad. Nevertheless, the very fact that the Hizbollah spokesperson would give an audience to American students is an indication of the Hizbollah’s willingness to adapt to the realities of the changing world order. The order of the day, thus, is of change through evolution and not revolution. 

A tactical maneuvering requires the Hizbollah spokesperson to reiterate his commitment to attacking IDF positions as long as they occupy "one square inch" of Lebanese territory, and of supporting the return of Palestinian refugees as a part and parcel of any "just" Arab-Israeli peace agreement. But, on the other hand, there is also the more pressing issue of seeking political legitimacy through peaceful means within Lebanon. If Hizbollah swings the other way it will be on account of frustrations within its Shia support base in Lebanon, and not due to foreign considerations alone. 

For the Lebanese, the quickest road to peace and development is probably going to run through the resolution of internal confession based conflicts. This means understanding the problems of its ignored communities and implementation of sweeping social justice legislation that accord each ignored sector of the Lebanese community with legitimate political, social and economic opportunities. 

Today, peace and social justice seem to be at opposite ends in Lebanon. The world, as defined by the western media, is euphoric in its celebration of the ‘peace’ being worked out in Lebanon. Yet underneath this cosmetic peace simmers the dissatisfaction and discontent of communities still awaiting their turn for genuine political recognition and participation in Lebanon. 

Their patience continues to be tested.

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From a personal interview with Ibrahim Mussawi, West Beirut, July 1999.

PSP leader Walid Jumblatt is quoted from Beirut media reports.