The initial gains Hizbollah made in Beirut and sections of South Lebanon in the mid to late 80s started wearing thin, especially with the decline of Iranian assistance in the aftermath of Ayatollah Khomeini’s death and the rolling back of his international Islamic revolution program by more moderate successors like President Rafsanjani and President Khatami. 

Within Lebanon the resentment towards Hizbollah had grown in some sectors due to its aggressive policies to implement the strict Islamic codes regarding public behavior in the mid-80s. During the civil war Hizbollah guerrillas aggressively enforced a ban on alcohol, and even tried to enforce modest dress codes and frowned on western entertainment. These measures caused a degree of opposition from portions of the Lebanese population whose interpretation of Islam and Sharia was not as orthodox as that of the Shia fundamentalists, and who questioned whether a return to fundamentalism would solve any of their problems. 

However, the major change in circumstances came with the rise of Syrian influence in Lebanese politics, especially in the years leading to the Taif accord, when it became increasingly obvious that no single militia or political party would be able to exercise sweeping control over Lebanon.

Hizbollah leadership has been quick to adapt to the changing circumstances and has taken appropriate measures in toning down its policies to attract loyal support among the Lebanese Shia. Hizbollah no longer enforces strict codes of conduct among the people, but Hizbollah dominated areas in Lebanon do tend to be more reserved and conservative in their cultural outlook. 

Politically speaking, the major shift in Hizbollah philosophy has been the transition from military, revolutionary ideals of creating an Islamic Lebanese state, to that of participating in a democratic political machinery that Hizbollah itself had highly criticized in the past. In the run up to the 1992 elections Hizbollah came to terms with its military strength and ambitions and realized that political participation would work towards the benefit of, both, Hizbollah and the Shia community. This period of transition lead to Hizbollah’s philosophy to change from one that was revolution driven to one that relies on evolution, through the powers of diplomacy and democracy, to achieve its goals.

"Now Nasrallah himself says that there can not be an Islamic state in Lebanon," points out Muhammad Sammak, a professor of modern politics at the American University of Beirut.  "The formation of a Lebanese Islamic state was a slogan raised during the conflict (civil war)," he adds, "Even the Iranians are not serious about this slogan now." 

Sammak believes that the Hizbollah has committed itself to the role of a participant in a democratic set up, and is opting for peaceful, democratic means of opposition to issues it feels strongly about. "Hizbollah did not vote in the recent budget," notes Sammak, "This was because the budget included income coming to the state from sources such as gambling, and Hizbollah believe that gambling is immoral and illegal as per Islam. This incident shows that Hizbollah is adapting to the political system and avoiding (violent) confrontation." 

The active participation in national politics and, at the same time, the continuation of military operations beyond the purview of the Lebanese Army makes Hizbollah a unique fundamentalist organization in the Middle East. In most cases the violent, armed fundamentalist organizations are not part of governments, and are usually banned and persecuted by the state - as is the case with radical fundamentalists in Algeria, Egypt and Syria. In cases where the fundamentalists are co-opted and are involved in government, they disarm and absolve themselves of their revolutionary roles, as with fundamentalists in Jordan. The Hizbollah plays a unique role of carrying out a revolutionary mission against foreigners on one end against Israel, while at the same time moderating its goals to suit fellow countrymen as part of the government.

Hizbollah continues to enjoy a loyal support group within the Shia community by reflecting its commitment to the community through its actions. Hizbollah welfare programs in Shia neighborhoods rival those of the Lebanese government across the country, offering interest free loans, education, medical care and pension schemes to the Shia community. While there have been sizeable cut backs in Hizbollah funding from its sources in Iran, Hizbollah has acted with enterprise and looked at lucrative investment opportunities in domestic and foreign markets to set up a regular flow of income for both, its welfare and military programs. 

The greatest surge in Hizbollah’s support base came in 1996, when Israel launched ‘Operation Grapes of Wrath.’ This sweeping Israeli military action against Lebanese civilians caused immense damage to life and property. The move was in keeping with earlier Israeli tactics, like the 1978 and 1982 invasions wherein Israel had sought to turn Lebanese public opinion against the Palestinians by hurting the Lebanese in return for Palestinian raids on Israel. In 1996, the Israelis planned on turning the Lebanese masses against the Hizbollah by blaming Hizbollah for the indiscriminate Israeli military actions against Lebanon.  But, instead of turning public opinion against the Islamic resistance, the Israeli raids focused public attention on Israeli atrocities, such as the massacre of Lebanese refugees in the shelling of the Fijian U.N. compound in Qana. Such incidents caused a wave of support for Hizbollah across Lebanon.

After the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, the softening of the Iranian agenda towards Lebanon has corresponded with an increased Syrian role within Lebanon. This consolidation of Syrian interests is evident in the acceptance of the 1990 Taif accord, which legitimizes the presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon and recognizes a ‘special’ relationship between Syria and Lebanon. In recognition of this Syrian domination in the area, the moderates within Israeli politics have tried to resolve their regional security concerns by forging a peace deal with Syria. The deal envisages a normalization of relations between Israel and Syria, wherein Israel would return control of the Golan Heights to Syria in return for security assurances over the demilitarization of the Golan Heights and cessation of all hostile military activity directed at Israel from South Lebanon. However this process of creating a deal with Syria, a deal that serves multiple Israeli interests, suffered severe setbacks over the tenure of right-wing Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu.

In July 1999 President Ehud Barak was elected to office in Israel. He defeated the incumbent Benjamin Netanyahu by promising peace with Syria and Lebanon, and withdrawal of all Israeli troops from south Lebanon. Barak has also promised to move towards a permanent solution to the Palestine question by negotiating and implementing all past agreements made with Arafat’s Palestinian Authority. Syrian President Hafez Assad has responded with praise and optimism directed towards Barak’s assurances.

"The two main players in the Middle East now are Barak and Assad," affirms Muhammad Sammak, a professor of modern politics at the American University of Beirut. "Assad has acknowledged Barak as a ‘strong and honest’ leader, while Barak has promised Assad a ‘peace of the brave’," notes Sammak, "These compliments are unprecedented." 

Sammak points towards a number of factors that have caused the warming of relations between Israel and Syria. The first is the general weakening of the hostile Arab front against Israel due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, which has caused a weakening of many Arab states that depended on the Soviets for military posturing in the region. 

The second factor has been the aggressive military role played by the U.S. and NATO in Iraq and Kosovo, which has been relatively unchallenged and has raised doubts among Arab states over whether they can afford to remain a military threat in the region against such superpowers. 

"The question asked is, will the action against Iraq be mirrored versus Syria (if Syria assumes the role of a local tyrant)," explains Sammak. Complimenting this, he adds, is the image building on the part of the Israelis as peace loving people, which makes it easier to target Syria as a nuisance if it does not make return Israeli peace gestures in kind. "The political situation is tailor made for Barak," says Sammak, adding that the U.S. is predisposed to a quick resolution of the Israel-Syrian discord as "Clinton (in his second and last term as U.S. President) is looking for a foreign policy triumph, and the Nobel peace prize for his role in resolving the crises in the Middle East."

Another factor in the softening of relations between Syria and Israel has been the lack of consensus between Arab states on what constitutes an acceptable compromise with Israel. The major players of the past wars with Israel have opted out of the conflict, leaving Syria alone. "Egypt made peace with Israel in 1979," Sammak points out, "In 1993 the Israelis got the Oslo agreement with the PLO, and in 1994 Jordan signed a peace deal with Israel. All of these developments have caused further indecision among Arab states on how to deal with Israel, especially as all of them have internal turmoil which they need to contain, and also as they don’t trust each other and have many misunderstandings between each other." 

Sammak concludes that the continuing threat from within, in addition to the threat from fellow Arab states and from Israel has prompted Hafez Assad to take steps to stabilize the security of his regime in the region. "Assad knows now that he can not ask for too much from Israel in return from peace," claims Sammak, "The assassination of Rabin proved to Syria that Israelis are unwilling to accept a high compromise. At the same time, the election of Barak also sends out the message to Syria that Israelis are willing to make peace now. Therefore, when Barak says a one year time period is enough to forge a peace deal, Assad responds by saying the one year period is more than enough, thereby showing that Syria is ready to make peace."

However, the nature of peace with Israel may lead to the furthering of Syrian presence in Lebanon. "Even after the conclusion of peace with Israel, Syria will continue to have an undercover interest in Lebanon," asserts Sammak, "This is largely to protect Assad’s regime from Sunni fundamentalist groups that might organize themselves in Lebanon if Syria withdraws." 

Assad’s fears are based on historical fact. In the past, independent Lebanon has played host to Syrian Sunni fundamentalists who have used Lebanon as a base to organize themselves and plan anti-Assad operations. While some Lebanese hope a peace deal with Israel will include the demand for Syrian troops to withdraw from Lebanon and, thus, an end to Syrian interference in Lebanese public life, this might not be the case.

Sammak notes that Barak himself has identified the issues regarding Syria and Lebanon as inseparable. The Lebanese state, after the 1983 assassination of Bashir Gemayel and the failed Israeli peace deal, is very cautious about any negotiation with Israel without Syrian understanding. "Since 1983, Lebanon refrains from going its own way in forging a peace deal with Israel," says Sammak, "Syria indirectly makes all decisions regarding Lebanon as far as the Middle East problem is concerned." 

Israel also needs Syrian compliance to check the Palestinian opposition to the Israeli-PLO Oslo treaty. Syrian troops guard the entrances of all Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, therefore acting as the de-facto first line of defense for Israelis against anti-Oslo Palestinian militia in Lebanon. In the interest of peace between Syria and Israel, Assad seems to be willing to contain Palestinian resistance to the Arafat deal within both, Syria and Lebanon. 

"The PFLP was instructed by Syrians recently (in July, 1999) to behave positively with respect to the new developments," notes Sammak, "There has been no adverse reaction to this Syrian directive from the PFLP or the DFLP."

As a matter of fact, the PFLP and DFLP representatives met with PLO representatives in July 1999 to hammer out their differences and seek common ground. As both the PFLP and DFLP leadership is based in Syria, this change of heart on the part of the erstwhile anti-Oslo, anti-Arafat organizations is seen to be largely on account of Syrian initiative to smoothen out its differences with Israel. The Israelis, on the other hand, could well see Syrian presence in Lebanon to be a worthy compromise in return for control over anti-Oslo Palestinian factions. 

However, while Syria has been successful in containing Palestinian resistance against Israel in Lebanon, it has not been able to wrest much control over the anti-IDF operations of the Hizbollah. Observers differ on their analysis of the lack of Syrian control over Islamic Resistance operations. Some feel that Syria has control over these operations but chooses to let them continue in order to keep the pressure on Israel for a speedy conclusion of the peace deal and return of the Golan Heights. Others feel that while Syria has little influence on Hizbollah operations, Hizbollah itself will stop its cross-border Katyusha missile attacks once Israel withdraws the IDF and the SLA as a part of the Israel-Lebanon peace treaty.

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From a personal interview with Professor Muhammad Sammak, conducted in Beirut, July 1999.