The withdrawal of the IDF troops and their SLA militia from the former occupied zone created a newly liberated Lebanese countryside with many problems of its own. The first among these was the presence of booby-trap and mines left behind by the SLA and the Israeli troops. In the initial thrust of the liberation, Hizbollah engineers did the best they could by clearing mined roads with improvised heavy machinery and blowing up all  SLA and IDF bunkers that might be booby-trapped. However, a large area of the South Lebanese countryside remained mined, too expansive an area for the Hizbollah to clear on its own.

As a result, tragic accidents occurred during the first few weeks of the liberation as unsuspecting and ignorant journalists and civilians returning to their villages and farms stepped on mines in the fields. The Hizbollah was quick to put notices near mine fields, warning the community not to approach the areas, but in many cases the Hizbollah did not have the information available. Ultimately the job fell into the lap of the UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon), which was flooded with volunteers and international aid agencies which rushed to provide relief in South Lebanon.

“I sit here and watch thousands of dollars being wasted every day,” mused Timur Goksel, the Spokesperson for the UNIFIL.  Goksel, a citizen of Turkey, arrived in South Lebanon as part of the first UNIFIL deployment in 1978, and spent 22 years waiting for the ‘interim’ force to complete its mandate. Goksel’s most recent “headache” is to monitor and administer the scores of international aid agencies who are trying to add South Lebanon to their numerous experiences in providing humanitarian relief.

“So many people come here with so many wild ideas and waste so much time chasing things that just can not be done the way they want them done,” explained Goksel. “I have had numerous offers to aid in mine clearance from people who would get themselves killed out there, and I have to tell them to lay off. Any time someone calls me and offers to help I immediately ask them to come down here and dig a well. The more pressing problems here deal with providing clean drinking water, but not many people in the aid business think of that.” A few minutes later, the interview is interrupted by a call for Goksel. It is another aid agency offering to help in the mine clearing operation. Goksel tells the caller that their request has been noted and then laughs out loud as he hangs up.

The UNIFIL was successful in recruiting a battalion of mine-clearing engineers from Ukraine, but it is estimated that it will take many more months before all of the 15,000 mines reported to have been laid by the Israelis and the SLA in South Lebanon can be cleared.

Another major challenge for the UNIFIL after the liberation of South Lebanon was to verify the withdrawal of the IDF troops. This involved mapping the Israel-Lebanon border and driving along it to check if and Israeli positions or troops were till remaining within the Lebanese border. The drawing up of this map became a major controversy as there were many contradictions between the Israeli, Lebanese and Syrian claims to where the border between Israel and Lebanon lay. The controversy heightened when the United Nations sent an independent observer to confirm the Israeli withdrawal, taking the job away from the UNIFIL that had both the experience and the ties with local authorities to conduct this mission. UN special envoy Terje Roed-Larsen, came under heavy criticism by the Lebanese government, the local press and the Hizbollah when he started to draw lines along the Lebanese maps and carved out a border that seemed to favor the Israeli claims in the dispute.

Both the Lebanese and Syrian governments maintained over the month of June 2000 that the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon had not been completed and that Israel remained in occupation of Lebanese territories, even though these territories amounted to no more than a few miles of incursion at most. The largest chunk of land under dispute, known as Chebaa farms, beyond the southeastern town of Chebaa, which the Lebanese claimed belonged to Lebanon, but which had been occupied by Israeli troops since 1967.

According to veteran Middle East correspondent Robert Fisk, the area of Chebaa Farms did, indeed, belong to Lebanon. “I did some research on the issue and came upon facts that support the Lebanese claims,” asserted Fisk. 

According to Fisk, the area was part of Lebanese territory at the time of its independence, but due to its remoteness it had no legitimate Lebanese authority exercising control over it. The area formed a common passageway for travel from Lebanon into Syria and Israel and was given to smuggling of contraband. Due to the absence of law and order in the farm areas, which often spilled over into Syria, the Syrians put a small police station in the town, which no one seemed to object to. When the Israelis occupied the Golan Heights in 1967, they looked down into these farms and saw a little post with a Syrian flag on it. They assumed that the area was part of the Syrian Golan and occupied it as well, with the two Syrian policemen at the post running away at the sight of an approaching army. Since then, the Israelis have maintained that the area is Syrian and demand that any negotiation regarding the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the area has to be tied to the Israel-Syria peace treaty over the Golan Heights.

For the Hizbollah, who had claimed for many years that they would attack Israeli position as long as they occupied a “single inch of Lebanese soil” the Israeli occupation of the Chebaa farms became a pressure point.  Well into June 2000, the Hizbollah officials maintained that they were ready to resume attacks on the Israeli positions if they did not withdraw from the Chebaa farms. To add to the confusion, UN Secretary General Koffi Annan announced in June 2000 that he had accepted Terje Larsen’s verification of the IDF withdrawal from Lebanon. This infuriated the Lebanese government.

The UNIFIL officers were caught in a bind. “As far as we are concerned our area of operations within Lebanon included Chebaa town, but we never included Chebaa farms in the UNIFIL zone,” explained one UNIFIL officer who had run the Chebaa outpost of the Indian peacekeeping battalion (INDBATT).  The officer, who monitored the Israeli occupation of the area known as ‘C Company’ in INDBATT, explained that for the UNIFIL, who had arrived to the zone in 1978, the area of Chebaa farms was outside the UN mandate as it had been occupied by the Israelis in 1967 as part of their campaign against Syria. Therefore, the UNIFIL never thought of operating its peacekeeping operations in Chebaa farms as it had in the rest of South Lebanon. 
 

However, the issue of the Israeli withdrawal went beyond the status of Chebaa farms, and UNIFIL officials admitted that the verification of the IDF withdrawal had been a premature and inaccurate exercise. “This is a border on wheels,” mused Timur Goksel, spokesperson of UNIFIL. “The Israelis pull back when they see us coming for the verification and they return and set up their posts and barbed wires once we leave.”

For the Israeli armed forces some areas along the Lebanese border did account for strategic advantages. Slightly higher hills a few hundred meters inside Lebanon were a better place to position an observation post than on flat land which could not look beyond the short hill. Similarly, facing an enemy artillery position from lower ground was undesirable, while the IDF would definitely have the upper hand if it maintained its guns on higher elevation than the surrounding areas. The Hizbollah and the IDF had seen these realities of combat prove themselves in the raids and charges on Beaufort castle and other high altitude IDF positions in which the Hizbollah had lost many fighters while attacking. 

Talking to visiting journalism students in Beirut, Hizbollah officials asserted in June 2000 that the organization's guerrillas were ready to commence attacks on Israeli troops in South Lebanon if they did not vacate the territories. 

Muaffak Jammal, who joined the Hizbollah resistance guerrillas in 1982 to repel the Israeli invasion, said that the organization rejected the verification of the Israeli withdrawal by the United Nations and would not accept the presence of Israeli troops on Lebanese soil.

"We refuse to adhere to the 'blue line' drawn by the U.N.," said Jammal, "We will only accept the verification of the Israeli withdrawal if it is announced by the Lebanese government. Until such time that a single Israeli soldier remains on even ten centimeters of Lebanese soil, we are prepared to continue our resistance and attack them."

The Hizbollah were awaiting a decision by its leadership and the Lebanese and Syrian government on the issue. Meanwhile, aware of the damage the premature verification of the IDF withdrawal had caused, United Nations Secretary General Koffi Annan visited Beirut and admitted that certain discrepancies remained in the verification of the Israeli withdrawal from South Lebanon, but stressed that the dispute be sorted out by negotiations and dialogue. Annan also met Hizbollah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, who informed Annan that the organization was not ready to accept the verification drawn up by the United Nations inspectors.

In foreign policy decisions, such as the dispute with Israel over the current crises in South Lebanon, the Lebanese government relied heavily on advice from the Syrian government. Due to the transitionary phase in Syrian politics created by the death of Hafez Assad, any decision on the situation was unlikely until Bashar Assad, the son of Hafez, was firmly secure in his role as 
President of Lebanon. 
 

However, while it was unlikely that the Hizbollah would resort to any immediate escalation of the conflict by attacking Israeli positions, the upcoming parliamentary elections in Lebanon in August could generate pressure regarding the issue.

"If we want we can use the issue of the liberation of the south to get up to 40 seats in parliament, but that is not our aim," clarified Jammal, who asserted that Hizbollah had observed continuing Israeli forces in 20 Lebanese territories. "We have lost thousands of Hizbollah fighters and Lebanese civilians in our resistance against the Israeli occupation," he added, "We are not going to let the Israelis sit on even one inch of our land."

Nevertheless, the organization's mood was upbeat after the recent meeting between Sayyed Nasrallah and Koffi Annan. It also seemed as if Annan had, in turn, been able to convince the Hizbollah leadership that they stood to gain more by showing restraint than by choosing to escalate the crises. "For many years we have been struggling against the propaganda in the Western media that has portrayed us as terrorists," said Hizbollah member Sheikh Atallah, "Annan's visit has recognized our legitimacy as a valid and justified resistance force in Lebanon." 

Meanwhile, Israel refused to back down from its stand that its withdrawal from Lebanon was complete. Israeli troops fortified their lines and set up electrified fences along their new positions which they claimed were inside Israeli territories. As a growing number of Lebanese civilians took to the border fences to shower their displeasure at the Israelis, the IDF soldiers dealt with the Lebanese spectators across the fence with a mixture of restraint and force. In the two months since their withdrawal, Israeli forces opened fire on the Lebanese-Israeli border many times to disperse stone throwing and garbage dumping crowds, but accounts varied on who was involved and the number of wounded.

In an incident in June 2000, Israeli troops opened fire on a group of Jordanian nationals at the Fatima gate in Kifar Kila, wounding three Jordanians and a Lebanese. While Israel claimed it fired on people cutting the fence, the Jordanians said they were merely raising slogans against Israeli occupation and offering prayers at the gate.

The use of force by the Israelis against Lebanese civilians across the border threatened to become and issue that could lead to an escalation of the conflict yet again. To add fuel to the fire, the Israeli army ordered its soldiers on the Lebanon border to open fire with live ammunition on anyone attempting to cross the border into Israel in late June 2000.

According to media reports in Beirut, the Israeli army passed the official order on June 25, 2000, which allowed its soldiers to shoot to kill anyone posing a threat to the integrity of the Israeli positions on the border with Lebanon. Until this order was announced, the Israeli forces at the Lebanese border had claimed to have used rubber-coated steel bullets when they fired on protestors on the Lebanese side of the border. The Israeli-Lebanese border had by this time, become a popular site to visit by both tourists and people wishing to air their political views across the border at Israeli soldiers. Hundreds of people came down to the border, with the numbers swelling on the weekends (including Friday which is the Islamic Sabbath).

The Hizbollah issued an official statement warning Israel to desist from such acts which endangered the lives of Lebanese citizens. "We know how to deal with them with the necessary wisdom at the right time and under the right circumstances," the party said in a statement widely published across Lebanon.

A group of Palestinian students had reportedly pelted stones at the Israeli positions across the fence and injured one soldier on the day the Israeli Army decided to allow its soldiers to use live ammunition to shoot at demonstrators inside Lebanon. These orders would now allow Israeli soldiers to use their discretion and shoot-to-kill across the border into Lebanese territory.

The possibility of fatalities due to such firing from Israel into Lebanon presented a real danger of escalation of conflict in the region. In roughly two months, thirteen people had been injured by Israeli firing since the border fence was put up in May. If the Israelis resorted to live ammunition fire and kill Lebanese civilians, they could directly increase popular pressure on the Hizbollah in Lebanon to retaliate with Katyusha missile attacks into Israel. The Hizbollah were still bound by their oath to respond to casualties in Lebanon caused by the Israeli army.

Since 1996, Hizbollah had adhered to this publicly declared policy of firing Katyusha rockets into northern Israel in retaliation for civilian casualties in South Lebanon. Since the withdrawal in May, the Hizbollah had refused to fire back into Israel in keeping with a general policy of restraint, given the fragile nature of the political situation. However, if Lebanese civilians were killed by Israeli soldiers, Hizbollah, which had repeatedly warned Israel of repercussions for its continuing military presence in South Lebanon, would be pushed to retaliate.

The Hizbollah effectively controlled the security of the recently liberated areas of South Lebanon. They also controlled an arsenal of weapons that included artillery captured from retreating Israeli and SLA forces and also the cache of short and long-range Katyusha missiles procured from the Soviet Union and Iran in the last twenty years. These weapons were capable of reaching settlements such as Kiryat Shimona in northern Israel.

The United Nations, which used to control the flow of civilians in the occupied areas up to the Israeli positions, no longer had the jurisdiction to stop people from visiting the border. Over the last months thousands of civilians had visited the border fence, often raising slogans and heckling the Israeli soldiers on the other side. The Lebanese Army had tried to control the flow of civilians to the border areas, but as it had not deployed in South Lebanon it could only control the movement from the north to the border and failed to check on the movement of civilians living within the former occupied zone, near the border in the south.

The deployment of the Lebanese Army in South Lebanon itself was a matter of great political debate. Such an act, in effect, would account for a change in the policies of both the Syrian and the Iranian interests in Lebanon as it would effectively lead to a disarming and withdrawal of the Hizbollah from South Lebanon. 

"I don't think the Hizbollah will be replaced by the Lebanese Army in these areas any time soon," said Professor Nizar Hemzeh, who specializes in research on Islamic Fundamentalism at the American University of Beirut. "The Hizbollah are currently backed by both the Lebanese and the Syrian governments, and asking them to withdraw from South Lebanon, or disarming them, is politically unthinkable, as is deploying the Lebanese Army in the south as it will invariably lead to violence," he added. 

The Hizbollah were, politically, in a bind to react to the presence of Israeli soldiers in some Lebanese areas, and Israeli firing along the border. Hizbollah was constrained by the United Nations diplomatic efforts currently taking shape in Lebanon, and also restrained by the instability of the Bashar Assad regime in Syria. This was coupled by the desire in Iran to gradually normalize relations with the West, therefore even Hizbollah's spiritual leadership in Iran was, at this point, unwilling to unilaterally push the organization into a direct conflict with Israel, and thereby the United States.

However, if Israeli soldiers did decide to shoot-to-kill across the border and cause casualties among Lebanese civilians, they would free the Hizbollah’s hands to restart a military campaign against either the Israeli forces in Lebanese territories, or worse, against Israel itself. This is a situation that remains highly volatile.

The surest way to reduce tensions on the border would be for the Lebanese government to deploy its Army to oversee the border and perhaps create a buffer zone between the irate Lebanese citizens and the equally unpredictable Israeli soldiers. The most apparent problem in this respect was that the Lebanese Army was still a deeply divided and weak organization that could crumble in the face of any political crises and degenerate into warring factions as it had during the 1975 civil war, which had lasted over 15 years. 

“The Lebanese Army is currently purely in the service of President Emile Lahoud,” explained Dr. Abdel Hamid Beydoun a member of the Lebanese parliament from the secular Shia organization Amal. Amal had fought alongside the Hizbollah to drive out the IDF and the SLA, but Hizbollah were clearly the stronger military force. While the Amal, which competed with the Hizbollah for the popular vote, wanted to see a reduction in the armed presence of Hizbollah it realized that no credible military force existed that could take charge of the situation.

“The top commanders and officers in the Lebanese Army are Maronite Christians like the President,” claimed Beydoun “Though the lower ranks may have some diversity, it does not add up to much. The Syrian army currently guarantees the stable structure of the Lebanese army. If the Syrians leave, and the Lebanese army is given independent charge of the border areas and deployed there, it will split up into factions again.”

The UNIFIL has also voiced concerns that its mandate does not include policing the Lebanese-Israeli border, as that is not a peacekeeping mission. While the UNIFIL is currently being re-deployed, the units that have taken up posts along the border are only carrying out observation missions and do not yet have the authority to interfere in the movement of the Lebanese along their border, nor does the UNIFIL have the authority to protect the Lebanese from Israeli fire from across the border. In effect, the UNIFIL posts sit a few yards behind Hizbollah units, who have assumed the charge of the first line of defense in Lebanon.

By July 2000, the guerrillas of the Hizbollah were reinforcing their presence in South Lebanon, creating observation points and conducting patrols along specific points on the contentious Israeli border. Traveling along the disputed border region around the town of Chebaa, one could observe Hizbollah fighters building a temporary camp about a hundred yards from the Israeli border near the Indian UNIFIL observation post 4-7 C. 

An Israeli jeep patrol, driving down the road along the fence, stopped just short of a yellow gate on the Israeli side. The Israelis, having discovered the guerrillas, drove up a small hill and stopped among some bushes and watched the guerrillas, who continued to use a bulldozer to excavate earth and create a sand embankment in front of their small camp.

The Hizbollah position, estimated to be capable of holding about fifteen guerrillas, was described by the UNIFIL officer present at the scene to be an observation post. "They are trying to make their presence felt in the region," says the officer, "They want to tell the Israelis that Hizbollah has not left. That they can watch them just as they are watched."

At the Hizbollah camp, six fighters who wore camouflage fatigues stood unarmed. They made no attempt to hide their presence, but politely refused to answer any questions till such time they received orders to do so by the party leadership in Beirut. 

“The Hizbollah have started to establish units and posts along the border with Israel in an effort to develop an organized network of intelligence gathering and early warning,” explained Nicholas Blanford, the South Lebanon correspondent for The Daily Star, an English language daily newspaper published in Beirut. According to Blanford, the Hizbollah wanted to remain on top of the game and maintain its capability to deal with any future threats from the IDF. Maintaining observation posts and conducting regular lightly armed patrols along the border areas were, therefore, necessary to check for the infiltration of Israeli GSS agents back into Lebanon and also maintain its defensive capabilities, even though most of the heavy Hizbollah arms caches had been moved away from the border.

However, it would be wrong to assume that Hizbollah’s presence in South Lebanon was merely one of a military nature. In fact, the Hizbollah launched massive humanitarian and relief efforts almost immediately after the IDF withdrawal, and continued to have a greater and better-organized relief organization present on the ground than the Lebanese government many months after the liberation of the southern territories.

The only major hospital functioning in south Lebanon in July 2000 was being run by Hizbollah doctors and medical staff who had rushed to Bint Jbeil to get the abandoned facility running. A similar effort was also made in Marjayoun, where Hizbollah organized medical care facilities for the town’s people. In the more remote areas of the south the Hizbollah ran 9 mobile clinics where doctors such as Mohammad Harb worked voluntarily and for free.

Dr. Harb returned from the Kavkhaz area of the former Soviet Union after paying for his medical studies there - he did not accept the offer of a free tuition as was offered to many socialist leaning candidates in the 1980s. Dr. Harb, who is a relative of the slain Hizbollah leader Ragheb Harb, returned to set up a practice in Nabatieh, but dropped everything when the IDF withdrew in order to volunteer his services for the Hizbollah. 

“I visit about five villages every day,” said Dr. Harb, “The most common ailment here is diarrhea, which is primarily due to the fact that the IDF and the SLA did not care to maintain the water treatment facilities for these villages and conducted no developmental work here.” 

Barely two kilometers away, the water treatment plant lies abandoned. Water from the Litani was pumped through this plant, but the local villagers claimed that the IDF diverted the water into the Jewish settlements across the border in northern Israel, barely a few miles away. Civil engineers, such as Ali Sharafideen, are now working to get the plant going again.

Sharafideen, who was a foreman for construction companies in Beirut, joined Hizbollah’s Jihad al-Binaa (reconstruction jihad) after the liberation of the south. He also works for free and is excited about the work he is doing in the liberated areas.

“We are building a new road which will connect all these villages and run 8 kilometers long up to the town of Nabatieh,” offered Sharafideen, “There is so much to do here. The water treatment plant has been neglected for twenty years. The people need drinking water. We also need to build a new high school here and get the government to commit to running it.”

All along the newly liberated zones Hizbollah volunteers aid reconstruction work and help rehabilitate the families who are moving home after years of living in camps in Beirut or other Lebanese towns. The Hizbollah has become a fixture in the daily life of the liberated zone, but unlike the early years of its association with religious intolerance and repression it is now looked upon with respect and admiration by the local population.

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  Robert Fisk, “Lebanon on brink of war with Israel,” The Independent, 9 February 2000
  Robert Fisk, “Death comes calling again on a Crusader castle,” The Independent, 12 February 2000
  Robert Fisk, “US heaps blame on the victim, say Lebanese,” The Independent, 11 February 2000

  Robert Fisk, “After 22 Years, Israel Begins Its Departure From Lebanon,” The Independent, May 3, 2000.

  Robert Fisk, “Israel redirects Hellfire missiles ‘after US advice’,” The Independent, May 6, 2000.
  Robert Fisk, “Israel fires barrage of threats on eve of pull-out,” The Independent, May 10, 2000.
  Robert Fisk, “No mercy for Israel’s allies in South Lebanon,” The Independent, May 17, 2000.

  From an interview with UNIFIL officers in South Lebanon who witnessed the evacuation of SLA officers in May 2000. The UNIFIL officers had knowledge of the identity of GSS agents, and claimed that they were the first to leave the occupied areas and escape into Israel.

  Robert Fisk, “In the end, they just skulked away,” The Independent, May 23, 2000.
  From a personal interview with Hizbollah volunteers and prisoners who were present in or around the Khiam prison and Khiam village during the liberation.
  While SLA troops were given possession of some T-55 and T-72 Soviet tanks captured from the Syrians, the Israeli Merkava tank was operated only by the IDF troops.
  Robert Fisk, “Chaos, humiliation, bloodshed: after 22 years Israel withdraws from Lebanon,” The Independent, May 24, 2000.
  Robert Fisk, “The holy warriors of Hizbollah realize their impossible dream,” The Independent, May 25, 2000.
  Robert Fisk, “The holy warriors of Hizbollah realize their impossible dream,” The Independent, May 25, 2000.
  From a personal interview with Spokesperson Timur Goksel at the UNIFIL Headquarters in Naqoura, South Lebanon, July 2000.

  From a personal interview with Robert Fisk in Beirut, June 2000.
  From a personal interview with a UNIFIL officer in C Coy HQ in Chebaa, July 2000.

  From personal interviews with the Hizbollah press attaché in Beirut, June 2000.

  Syrian President Hafez Assad died of a prolonged illness soon after the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, on June 11, 2000. He did not live to see the fulfillment of his life-long dream to liberate all of Syrian territory from the Israeli occupation - a steadfast demand that had won him much praise and adoration among the Arab community. Hafez’s son Bashar had been groomed for the past few years for succession to the position of President of Syria, a grooming that had included a stint in independently handling the political situation in Lebanon. In fact, the blueprint of the year 2000 parliamentary elections in Lebanon, which included the redrawing of many new alliances and seat sharing, were reported to have been drawn up by Bashar himself. While Bashar’s candidacy for the Presidency was very strong, it was feared than any reversal of fortunes in terms of the crises with Israel would seal his failure by giving his detractors an issue to chase him out of office with. With this in mind, both the Lebanese government and the Hizbollah became especially cautious of their actions in relation to Israel, as they realized that the immediate danger of destabilizing Syria was far worse than suffering Israeli slights for a few months. 

  From a personal interview with Hizbollah members in Beirut, June 2000

  From a personal interview with Dr. Nizar Hemzeh at the American University of Beirut, June 2000.

  From a visit to the INDBATT area of operations in South Lebanon July 2000.
  From a personal interview with Dr. Mohammad Harb in the village of Taibe South Lebanon, July 2000.

  A first-hand account of observations made in South Lebanon in June-July 2000.
  Sheikh Ahmed Obeid is the cousin of the Hizbollah leader Abdel Karim Obeid, who continues to be held without trial in an Israeli prison.