There are, broadly speaking, two schools of thought in American foreign policy on how to deal with Islamic fundamentalism. Professor Hamzeh is critical of these traditional schools of thought that exist on Islamic fundamentalism as, he claims, both fail to correctly gauge the impact and longevity of Islamist movements such as the Hizbollah.

"There is one school that says all Islamist movements are extremist, so they push the ‘shoot them all’ formula, arguing that extremists will never become mainstream," says Hamzeh. Hamzeh claims that this group of thinkers, which includes many foreign policy framers in the United States, is largely suspicious of all Islamist movements, and dismisses the ones that try to co-opt democracy as doing so for "tactical reasons." To this think tank, the Islamist groups may modify their strategies to recoup and reorganize, but they will be unlikely to form a loyal opposition to their own government and may return to their old ways and resort to violence. 

The second school of thought, Hamzeh points out, looks at the post-1980s Islamist groups in Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, Pakistan, Jordan and Yemen and argues that fundamentalist Islamist forces are moving to work within the system of Parliamentary elections. "This school of thought argues that Islamist forces have been forced to move away from their violent, revolutionary agenda to one of co-option into the mainstream of social and political forces engaged in welfare services," says Hamzeh. Both schools, argues Hamzeh, fail to explain how and why Islamist organizations vary in their degree of radical thought and violent behavior, and also fail to prescribe a test to distinguish between the Islamic fundamentalist forces who are willing to co-opt into the political framework and those that are not.

Pointing towards the Hizbollah, Hamzeh explains that it is the level of crises in society that determines the choice between bullet and ballot for such organizations. "Living with the wicked requires a contract of utility," asserts Hamzeh, "This is not a question of love or compassion. Pragmatism does not mean liberalism or an acceptance of democracy, but a pragmatic strategy is a rejection of a revolutionary strategy." According to Hamzeh, the Islamists are in constant confrontation with the system, but resort to violence when faced with oppression and extreme social, economic and political conditions, as was the case in Algeria. He then points towards Jordan, where less extreme social conditions accompanied by efforts to co-opt Islamists have been able to achieve a rolling back of the violent, revolutionary Islamist agenda. Thus, it is often the nature of circumstances and degree of tolerance on the part of the state itself that determine the path an Islamist organization chooses to take.

Hamzeh also claims that it is easy to distinguish the Islamists who will be willing to join a democratic system from ones that will not give up revolutionary methods. "Those movements that provide social welfare services increase their constituencies through socio-economic justice," explains Hamzeh, "Such movements are more likely to have a high level of interest in working within the system. Those Islamist movements that do not provide social welfare services are usually the ones that are small, underground and violent."

By Hamzeh’s definition Hizbollah, as a provider of welfare, has the motivation, initiative and the interest to work within the democratic system, but given the social, economic and political crises may well turn back to revolutionary goals if the situation around it worsens and becomes increasingly oppressive and isolationist. 

However, Hizbollah’s interpretation of its local circumstances is also sizably influenced by its mentors in Iran, who look towards the efforts of co-option and sense the extremity of crises before the fundamentalist Shia community on an international scale.

After its formation in 1983, and subsequent recognition in 1984, Hizbollah attracted much attention for its activities, especially as it was seen to be acting at the behest of the Iranian leadership and Iranian foreign policy interests, right up to the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988. Notable among these activities were the hijackings and hostage takings in Lebanon by the Islamic Jihad, who were believed to be the ‘terrorist wing’ of the Hizbollah, and acting under direct orders from Khomeini himself. The terrorist tactics reportedly backfired on Iran when, after Khomeini’s death, the power struggle threatened to turn the Pasdaran factions of Ayatollah Montazeri and Iranian President Rafsanjani in a bitter clash against each other. 

"After President Rafsanjani took over in Iran in 1989, he pushed the country towards pragmatic reform," recalls Nizar Hamzeh, Associate Professor of Political Science at the American University of Beirut, "He put Islamists and Revolutionary Guard leaders into jails. The entire scene within Iran changed to one of curbing the International Islamic movement. Rafsanjani cut aid to Hezbollah by 50%, then by another 20%. Moderates subsequently called for cutting off all Iranian aid to Hizbollah, but Ayatollah Khameini stepped in and refused to allow that." 

The internal struggle that developed in Iran, between the moderates who sought to distance themselves from Khomeini’s agenda, and the fundamentalists who wanted to continue implementing the hard-line, also spilled over into the Hizbollah in Lebanon. In Khomeini’s time the Hizbollah had been generously funded by Iran, and was lead by hard liners such as Abbas Musawi, Mohammed Hussein Fadhallah and Subfi Tufayli, and their activities were coordinated by motivated, fundamentalist Iranians like Ali Akbar Mohtashemi. However, with the election of moderates lead by President Rafsanjani, the political force in post-Khomeini Iran sought to distance itself from the legacy of the radical Islamic revolution and started to influence changes within the Hizbollah in Lebanon. 

This was indicated early in 1990 by Iranian Foreign Minister A. A. Vilayati who, in trying to restore diplomacy with Egypt, pointed towards the new Iranian administration’s efforts to discontinue the earlier ‘Lebanon policy’ of supporting Hizbollah. The step back from the Mohtashemi-Musawi era was shown to be a sign of Iranian willingness to trade radicalism in exchange for better relations with the outside world. 

The change in Iranian attitude directly affected the Hizbollah infrastructure and leadership.  One such development, coming after the ascension of political moderates in post-Khomeini Iran, was the removal of Sheikh Subfi Tufayli (who had been Hizbollah’s Secretary General during the hostage taking phase) and the passing over of the post to Sheikh Abbas Musawi. The change came after a meeting between Hizbollah leaders and Iranian President Rafsanjani in 1991, and indicated Rafsanjani’s intent to improve relations with the West by moving Hizbollah’s focus, from an unrepentant revolutionary resistance on all fronts, to a more limited role of combating Israeli troops in south Lebanon. 

After the murder of Abbas Musawi in 1992, Hojjatoleslam Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah was chosen to be the next Secretary General of Hizbollah. Nasrallah was the first Lebanese southerner to hold the post, and had been a hard liner in the past having acted as Hizbollah military chief. In this role he had been closely attached to Iranian hard liners. In fact, in the 1980s Nasrallah was known as the most faithful disciple of Ayatollah Khomeini and had also gained prominence as a military leader in the intra-Shia disputes - Hizbollah’s violent clashes with Amal. 

After Khomeini’s death, Nasrallah had aligned himself with Iranian hard-liners like Ali Akbar Mohtashemi and Ayatollah Khamenei. He was, consequently, sidelined by moderate forces of President Rafsanjani and kept in Tehran as Hizbollah’s ‘representative’. After Israeli forces killed Abbas Musawi, Ayatollah Khamenei pressed for Nasrallah’s appointment and succeeded. It should be noted that Nasrallah subsequently made accommodations towards his previously radical views, and as Hizbollah Secretary General he remains in tune with the foreign policy aspiration of a moderate Iranian government. 

The changes in Iran also reflected in the way Lebanese Shia leaders acted on developments within Iran. In 1993, the question of who would be Grand Ayatollah Golpaygani’s successor split opinions between Mohammed Hussein Fadhallah and Hizbollah Secretary General Sayyed Nasrallah. Fadlallah backed the candidacy of Ayatollah Mirza Ali Sistani of Najaf, while Nasrallah backed Ayatollah Khamenei.  Thus, not only were the Lebanese Shia leaders affected by developments in Iran, they were also divided on what they believed should be the future of the Shia movement in Iran itself. The process of change was no longer one-way, as it had been under Ayatollah Khomeini -  it had now become a two way street.

Amal, as a Shia militia and as a Shia political party, is heavily influenced by Syria. The Amal-Syrian ties go back to Imam Musa al-Sadr’s recognition of the Alawites as members of the Shia community in 1973. This declaration was made to benefit Syrian Alawite President Hafez Assad who was, at that time, facing a Sunni fundamentalist challenge in Syria. Al-Sadr’s declaration gave Assad the Islamic recognition he required, as an Alawi, to be able to put down Sunni fundamentalism. In return Syria helped al-Sadr create the Amal militia. 

Amal shared Syria’s distrust of the PLO, and supported Syrian proposals for political reform and reconstruction in Lebanon. After Israel refused to allow Syrian entry into the South, Syria used Amal to help control the area. Amal gained Syrian support in its war of the camps with the Palestinians in Lebanon, as Syria wanted to rid the camps of Arafat’s influence. The conflict ended with pro-Syrian Palestinian militia, such as the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine) and the DFLP (Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine), gaining control of the Lebanese refugee camps. Hizbollah, on the other hand, rejected Amal overtures for a settlement with Israel over the occupation in the south, and aligned itself with the PLO in 1986. 

Syria, having full support of Amal in the mid-80s, saw Hizbollah as a hindrance, especially as Hizbollah’s radical Islamist vision was incompatible with Syria’s goals of reconstructing a pluralistic and secular Lebanon. Control over Hizbollah was also necessary in order for Syria to calibrate the pressure of the Shia resistance against Israel in the South.  Differences over these matters often brought the Iranian backed Hizbollah into conflict with Amal and Syria.

The nature of the Syrian-Iranian alliance has repeatedly had an effect on the fortunes of the Hizbollah in Lebanon. The pan-Arab secular Ba’athist Syria and Islamic fundamentalist Iran have had an ‘odd-couple’ understanding in their larger strategic and tactical interests to check the U.S. hegemony over the area. This special relationship between the ideologically disparate states of Iran and Syria also stems from their common need to address primary concerns in combating the shared threat from Iraq and Turkey. In the post-Khomeini and post-Soviet era of the 1990s, both Iran and Syria have sought to accommodate their strategic interests to the realities of the new world order. 

However, while Syria has tried to recently consolidate its relationship with the West and make peace with Israel, Iran has used the situation to consolidate its regional interests by demanding Syrian concessions to the Hizbollah in return for Iranian co-operation. Thus, the Hizbollah have, among other things, become a factor in the counter-balancing of the regional power between Syria and Iran. For instance, during the mobilization of support for the U.S. lead initiative to oust Iraq out of Kuwait in 1990, Iran chose not to oppose the Syrian support to Western forces, and in return Syria did not press for the disarming of Hizbollah in south Lebanon. 

Iranian support in the past had meant that the Hizbollah could offer the Shia community a comprehensive welfare package that gave them a leg up over Amal influence in the community. The Shia were, all things considered, in a desperate shape after the Israeli invasion of 1978. They occupied slums near Beirut’s common sewer and their areas of residence came to be known as the ‘belt of misery’. Basic necessities such as clean water and electricity were a luxury. As the situation in the south worsened, more and more Shia refugees fled to these slums. The Lebanese government, and also fellow Muslim Sunnis in Beirut, refused to help the Shia, while powerful minorities continued to enjoy the benefits of political power. For instance, Walid Jumblatt, a Druze leader of the Progressive Socialist Party, used his position as the Minister of Public Works to ensure the Druze villages had all the basic amenities secured. The visible disparity between the Shia and the other confessions around them bred anger and discontent and proved to be the bastion for the Hizbollah cadre. 

The extensive package of social welfare activities offered to the Lebanese Shia community by Hizbollah is largely in keeping with the philosophy of an Islamic welfare state. In the early 80s most of the assistance to set up and run these programs in Lebanon came directly from Iran. Iran, under the guidance of Ayatollah Khomeini in the early 80s, saw the Lebanese Shia as a fertile ground to plant the seeds of exporting the Islamic revolution.  Therefore, millions of dollars in assistance were channeled to the Hizbollah to secure the allegiance of the Lebanese Shia towards the Islamic resistance movement. 

In 1984 the Hizbollah started the Jihad al-Binaa, or the construction jihad, to help rebuild the homes and properties of the Shia, especially those that had been destroyed by Israeli bombings. The same year they also launched the Islamic Health Committee that opened clinics and built hospitals to serve the poor, mostly within Shia communities, who could not afford expensive medical treatment in private Lebanese hospitals. In 1987 the social welfare branch of the Relief Committee of Imam Khomeini (RCIK) opened in the southern suburbs of Beirut to ‘alleviate the pain of the Lebanese oppressed who had not only suffered at the hands of the colonialists, but were further afflicted, impoverished and orphaned by the civil war and the wars of opportunists seeking to overtake their country’.  The combined work of these Hizbollah agencies provided relief in material and medical terms to the Shia community, many of whom had grown highly disillusioned with the leadership of the Amal.

The threatened loss of Shia support drove the Amal militia into a violent clash with the Hezbollah in 1987 and the fighting between the two intensified in Beirut in 1988. It took the reluctant agreement of Iran and intervention by Syrian troops to stop the bloodshed. Subsequently Amal announced the disbanding of all its militia except in the south where it still organizes military strikes against IDF and SLA (South Lebanon Army, an Israeli proxy militia).  However the clashes between Hizbollah and Amal continued into 1989, till Syrian intervention once again put a stop to them. 

The steel-fisted nature of Syrian influence in Lebanon has helped keep the peace between Amal and Hizbollah, ensuring participation in the 1992 elections, and even power sharing in the 1996 elections between the two parties in the Shia community. 

The measure of Syrian influence depends directly on the Iranian support and complicity in a common desirable goal within Lebanon. As mentioned earlier, Iran, first under President Rafsanjani and now under President Khatami, has sought to put some distance between itself and Hizbollah’s radical fundamentalist elements. As an extension of this policy, Iran has largely co-operated in Syrian efforts to reign in renegade Hizbollah leaders who have sought to inconvenience Syrian ambitions in Lebanon through actions such as the opposition to the Taif accord or opposition to the Syrian and Lebanese peace negotiations with Israel. Thus, the threat to Khatami from radicals such as Ali Akbar Mohtashemi and Ayatollah Khamenei in Iran mirrors the divisions between the Hizbollah hard-liners like Sheikh Subfi Tufayli (who is now under Syrian house arrest in the Bekaa) and more moderate leaders like current Hizbollah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah. 

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From -  Edgar O’Ballance, Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism, 1979-95: The Iranian Connection (NY: Washington Square, 1997), pp. 75-98.

From -  Anoushiravan Ehteshami, After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic (NY: Routledge, 1995), pp. 140-141.

From -  Edgar O’Ballance, Islamic Fundamentalist Terrorism, 1979-95: The Iranian Connection (NY: Washington Square, 1997), pp. 119-120.

From -  Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System (NY: Routledge, 1997), pp. 139, 140.

From -  Anoushiravan Ehteshami, After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic (NY: Routledge, 1995), p. 53.

From -  Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System (NY: Routledge, 1997), pp. 130-135.

From -  Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System (NY: Routledge, 1997), pp. 87-116.

From -  Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance (NY: Columbia university Press, 1997), p. 146.

From -  Hala Jaber, Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance (NY: Columbia university Press, 1997), p. 147.