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Title:: WHEN THE LIGHTS GO OUT IN = CHESHIRE.
Authors:: Buckley, Geoffrey = L.¹
Bain, Nancy=20 R.²
Swan, Donald L.³
Source:: Geographical Review; Oct2005, Vol. 95 = Issue 4,=20 p537-555, 19p, 1 chart, 1 map, 3bw
Document Type:: Article
Subject Terms:: *ENVIRONMENTAL=20 justice
*COAL
POWER-plants
COMPANY towns
AMERICAN Electric = Power=20 Co.
Geographic = Terms:: CHESHIRE (Ohio)
OHIO
Author-Supplied = Keywords:: American Electric = Power
coal
company=20 towns
environmental justice
Ohio
power plants
Abstract:: The purchase and subsequent demolition = of=20 Cheshire, Ohio--located in the shadow of the General James M. Gavin = Power=20 Plant--has attracted national attention. According to a New York Times = report,=20 "the deal =E2=80=A6 is believed to be the first by a company to = dissolve an entire=20 town." In this article we consider historical precedents for the case, = explore=20 the thirty-year history of community-plant relations in Cheshire, and = recount=20 the series of incidents that ultimately led to the town's sale. We = discuss the=20 impact that the town's sale has had on the local community and the = larger=20 implications of American Electric Power's actions. [ABSTRACT FROM=20 AUTHOR]; Copyright of Geographical Review = is the=20 property of American Geographical Society and its content may not be = copied or=20 emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the = copyright=20 holder's express written permission. However, users may print, = download, or=20 email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No = warranty=20 is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the = original=20 published version of the material for the full abstract. = (Copyright=20 applies to all Abstracts)
Author = Affiliations:: ¹Associate professor of = geography,=20 Ohio University, Athens, Ohio 45701
²Professor of = geography,=20 Ohio University, Athens, Ohio 45701
³Central Washington=20 University, Ellensburg, Washington 98926
Full Text Word = Count:: 8870
ISSN:: 0016-7428
Accession = Number:: 21978871
Persistent link to this record:=20: http://search.ebscohost.com/log= in.aspx?direct=3Dtrue&db=3Deih&AN=3D21978871&site=3Dehost-liv= e
Cut and Paste:: <A=20 = href=3D"http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=3Dtrue&db=3Deih= &AN=3D21978871&site=3Dehost-live">WHEN=20 THE LIGHTS GO OUT IN CHESHIRE.</A>
Database:: Environment Complete

WHEN THE LIGHTS GO OUT IN CHESHIRE

The purchase and subsequent demolition of = Cheshire,=20 Ohio--located in the shadow of the General James M. Gavin Power = Plant--has=20 attracted national attention. According to a New York Times report, "the = deal =E2=80=A6=20 is believed to be the first by a company to dissolve an entire town." In = this=20 article we consider historical precedents for the case, explore the = thirty-year=20 history of community-plant relations in Cheshire, and recount the series = of=20 incidents that ultimately led to the town's sale. We discuss the impact = that the=20 town's sale has had on the local community and the larger implications = of=20 American Electric Power's actions.

Keywords: American Electric Power; coal; = company towns;=20 environmental justice; Ohio; power plants

In Loving memory of the Little Village of = Cheshire, who=20 was slain in the name of progress by the Purveyors of greed. Although = dear=20 Cheshire, you were never big or famous, or you were never really = beautiful, you=20 overcame all these things, because to us you were home. You were a = comfort to=20 the elderly and a haven for your weary children, you were a source of = girlhood=20 fantasies and boyhood dreams. Although your children travelled the world = over in=20 war and peace, they always returned to you and your comforting rural = ways. In=20 years gone by you proudly withstood flood and disaster but this time, it = was far=20 too much even for you. So now as you lay [sic] torn and buried all the = fond=20 memories of you will live forever in our hearts. Rest in peace, Proud = Cheshire.=20 Sadly missed by Countless Survivors.

--Author unknown, ca. 1973

On 16 April 2002 American Electric Power = (AEP), the=20 nation's largest utility, announced that it was buying the town of = Cheshire=20 (Figure 1), located on the Ohio River adjacent to the General James M. = Gavin=20 Power Plant, for $20 million (AEP 2002a). For months, Cheshire's = residents had=20 been locked in a contentious battle with AEP over the plant's noxious = emissions.=20 According to newspaper reports the trouble started when "clouds of = sulfuric=20 acid"--what AEP referred to as "plume touchdowns"--descended on the = village more=20 than a dozen times during June and July of 2001 (Downing 2001). The = "blue=20 clouds" actuated a community response that ultimately led to the town's = sale.=20 Now the battle was over. Within hours, journalists from around the = country were=20 making their way to rural southeastern Ohio to cover the story. By the = fall of=20 2003, most of the town's 221 inhabitants had departed. Since then, homes = and=20 commercial structures have been razed to make room for a new = barge-unloading=20 facility (AEP 2002a). A New York Times report, echoed in The Guardian of = London,=20 asserted, "The deal =E2=80=A6 is believed to be the first by a company = to dissolve an=20 entire town" (Seelye 2002; Teather 2002).

Cheshire has been all but erased from the map, = but its=20 ghost lives on. Much to the discomfiture of AEP, neither the town nor = the story=20 will go away. With issues of energy supply and demand once again in the = national=20 spotlight, a detailed examination of the Cheshire case is both timely = and=20 illuminating. First and foremost, it reminds us that the electricity we = use on a=20 daily basis comes at a price--a price measured in human and = environmental terms.=20 Second, it serves to warn us that technological "fixes," even when = applied with=20 the best of intentions, do not always produce the desired results. = Finally, it=20 exposes flaws in news media coverage of the story. Most newspaper = accounts=20 failed to investigate Cheshire's turbulent thirty-year relationship with = its=20 colossal downstream neighbor, focusing instead on the details of the = buyout=20 (Figure 2). To truly understand what happened to Cheshire and, more=20 significantly, why it should matter to us, we must consider the history = of=20 problems--from minor inconveniences associated with plant construction = and=20 maintenance to serious health and safety risks--that residents endured = for over=20 three decades. Only then can we begin to appreciate the decisions = residents and=20 company officials made that resulted in the buyout of the village.

AN EPHEMERAL LANDSCAPE

Contrary to what the aforementioned New York = Times=20 report might have us believe, this was not the first time a company = "dissolved"=20 an entire town. As numerous scholars have shown, towns with close ties = to a=20 single industry are particularly susceptible to the vagaries of economic = cycles=20 and corporate planning, often existing "on the knife edge of the = interactions=20 between global and local forces" (Hayter 2000, 291; see also Melzer = 1980; Smith=20 1993; Amundson 1995). According to Roger Hayter, these = "industry-resource" towns=20 are "dominated by extraction and primary processing of = (non-agricultural)=20 natural resources, non-renewable or renewable" (2000,291).

Long associated with mining, but also with = other=20 extractive industries, "company towns" were especially important = features in the=20 United States during the first half of the twentieth century. In = southern=20 Appalachia during the 1920s, for instance, an estimated two-thirds to=20 three-fourths of all miners and their families in eastern Kentucky, = southern=20 West Virginia, and southwestern Virginia lived in company towns (Corbin = 1981).=20 These were not necessarily permanent settlements. Occasionally, mining = companies=20 found it advantageous to move occupants out of their company-owned = dwellings so=20 that mining operations could be expanded or, given the prohibitive cost = of=20 transporting waste, so that a more economically suitable location for = tailing=20 waste could be found (Alanen 1982; Bridge 2000). In other cases, towns = were=20 abandoned when new technologies were introduced or as a result of market = declines (Melzer 1980; Francaviglia 1991; Amundson 1995).

What about towns not owned by a company? In = this=20 instance, Butte, Montana serves as an example. Although initially tied = to gold=20 and silver mining, it was the copper industry that left an indelible = imprint on=20 this city. In reference to the Berkeley Pit, William Wyckoff wrote: "A = large=20 number of suspicious fires and planned demolitions on the city's east = side as=20 well as a local plan to relocate the entire Uptown commercial center = anticipated=20 continued expansion of the pit into the CBD" (1995,483). Thus the = company=20 purchased or otherwise acquired entire communities, razed their = structures, and=20 then expanded its operations.

Of course, some towns, parts of towns, and = other parcels=20 of land have been bought for reasons associated with environmental=20 contamination. Phelps Dodge purchased land from ranchers in the vicinity = of its=20 copper smelter in Douglas, Arizona (Aiken 1999; Schwantes 2000). = Petrochemical=20 companies in Louisiana's "Cancer Alley" bought out nearby communities to = "limit=20 their liability" (Wright, Bryant, and Bullard 1994, 117-118). On other=20 occasions, the federal government offered the buyout. Times Beach and = Love Canal=20 are the most infamous--but not the only--examples (Cable and Benson = 1993; Capek=20 1993; Colten and Skinner 1996). Similarly, city, state, and federal = governments=20 have exercised their authority to clear the way for major projects, = including=20 dams and reservoirs (Koeppel 2000; Gandy 2001), highways, ballparks, and = prisons=20 (Guti=C3=A9rrez 1994; Lewis 1997; Bullard 2004), often at the expense of = communities=20 of color.

What makes the Cheshire case unique is that it = does not=20 fit neatly into any of these categories. It was not a company-owned = town,=20 although clearly it was greatly influenced by AEP. It was not supplanted = by the=20 mining industry. Nor was it the site of a toxic waste facility or dump. = In the=20 end, it was purchased by a utility, not the federal government. It is a = hybrid=20 of sorts--a "company town" not owned by a company. It is this = relationship,=20 between the town and the utility over a thirty-year period, that merits = further=20 investigation.

Recent research shows that fossil-fuel = extraction and=20 production have negative and inequitable social and environmental costs = and that=20 drilling and mining operations often engender organized community = responses=20 (Hall 1994; Newfont 1999; Lee 2002; O'Rourke and Connolly 2003; Maxwell = 2004).=20 This is particularly true in economically disadvantaged sections of = Appalachia,=20 where resistance to surface and underground coal mining has deep roots = (Bingman=20 1993; Cable 1993; Gaventa 1998; Fisher 1999; Abramson 2001; Montrie = 2003). As=20 Nancy Maxwell (2004) and Julie Sze (2005) point out, the burning of = fossil fuels=20 at electric power plants also tends to place inequitable burdens on = underserved=20 populations, leading to citizen opposition. With 98.2 percent of its = population=20 described as white in the 2000 census and a poverty rate that matches = the U.S.=20 average, it would be difficult to characterize Cheshire as a = disadvantaged=20 community (U.S. Census Bureau 2006). Nevertheless, a convincing argument = can be=20 made that its demise is best understood in the context of the = environmental=20 justice literature.

In reference to wind power in the western = United States,=20 Martin Pasqualetti recently remarked that "spatial separation buffers = the places=20 of energy development from the places of resource use. Consequently, = electricity=20 seems to come not from the earth but from a switch, the elaborate and = almost=20 omnipresent equivalent of magic" (2000,390). The Cheshire case deserves = our=20 attention because it reminds us that most of our electricity comes from = the=20 earth and that it comes with a price tag attached. Perhaps more = important, it=20 causes us to acknowledge the distance, both physical and psychological, = that=20 separates our landscapes of power production from our landscapes of = power=20 consumption.

IMPROBABLE NEIGHBORS

As the epigraph to this article suggests, = Cheshire's=20 "death" did not come as a complete surprise. In fact, the town, which = was=20 incorporated in 1954 but had had a post office since 1826, endured = longer than=20 some prognosticators would have dared to predict. Neglecting to = investigate the=20 historical roots of the town's problems, reporters missed an opportunity = to give=20 a full accounting of Cheshire's predicament. One account in particular, = Andrew=20 Goodheart's essay in the New York Times Magazine, is notable for its = frivolous=20 treatment of the crisis:

It's easy to imagine how Hollywood would = script it. One=20 or two plucky souls stand up at a town meeting and vow to fight. The = plant's=20 owner, a ruthless multibillion-dollar corporation, strikes back with = everything=20 its high-priced attorneys can devise, or worse. Someone has to die. And = finally,=20 good (or just possibly evil) prevails. But that's not what happened. = Instead, it=20 was something quite undramatic, or at least uncinematic: in a series of = town=20 meetings in the spring of 2002, lawyers presented an offer from American = Electric Power to buy all of Cheshire for $20 million. The 200-odd = residents=20 would have to move, their houses would be razed and their community = would cease=20 to exist--and in exchange they would each receive about three times the = assessed=20 value of their property. Though a few dissenters stood up and said they = would=20 rather fight than leave, they couldn't sway their neighbors. Nothing = rallied the=20 townspeople to resist, to tap the stubborn courage of the American = heartland, to=20 show the company that their hometown couldn't be bought. =E2=80=A6 They = would waive=20 their right to sue. They would take the money, and they would lose = Cheshire.=20 (Goodheart 2004, 41, 46)

He goes on to obscure the case further with = his=20 disdainful treatment of the town's residents:

To mourn for Cheshire is to mourn the loss of = a=20 Capra-esque myth: the idea of a square-shouldered native obstinacy in = the face=20 of corporate bullying. We all say we want to live in Bedford Falls, but = when the=20 chips are down, we'd rather take the cash and buy a McMansion in = Pottersville.=20 And so we look at the former citizens of Cheshire not just with pity but = also=20 with annoyance or even scorn--feelings made all the sharper because we = suspect=20 that if we were in their shoes, we'd have done the same thing. = (Goodheart 2004,=20 47)

Rather than treat Cheshire's residents with = scorn, we=20 maintain that a historical analysis of the crisis would have better = served the=20 magazine's readership.

Cheshire's experience with the utility = industry dates=20 back more than half a century. These fifty years can be divided into = four broad=20 and overlapping periods. During the early years, from approximately 1952 = to=20 1969--after the Kyger Creek Station was built but before the Gavin plant = was=20 constructed--Cheshire enjoyed relatively good relations with the = industry.=20 Following construction of the Gavin facility came a period of = adjustment. During=20 this twenty-five-year interval residents adapted to life in the shadow = of the=20 plant. Strained relations lasted from about 1995 to 2001, during which = time AEP,=20 in order to comply with federal mandates, made several significant = changes to=20 plant operations. By early 2002 many of Cheshire's residents were ready = to chart=20 a course that would lead to the buyout.

To fully grasp how and why events unfolded the = way they=20 did, we need to turn the clock back to 1952, when the Ohio Valley = Electric=20 Corporation built the coal-fired Kyger Creek Station 1.5 miles south of = Cheshire=20 to provide power for the new atomic plant near Piketon, Ohio, about 50 = miles=20 west of Cheshire. According to longtime residents, operations at the = Kyger Creek=20 Station had little effect on the community. For the next decade and a = half,=20 people went about their business. But big changes were in store.

Unknown to residents, the Franklin Realty = Company of=20 Canton, Ohio began to acquire land from local farmers and residents in = 1969.=20 Five days of purchases in the vicinity of the power site, amounting to = 616.77=20 acres, are listed in Table I. By far the largest parcels were acquired = from=20 members of the Swisher family, whose forebears had acquired the land in = the=20 nineteenth century. According to one family member, there was no = indication that=20 the realty company--a subsidiary of the utility--would transfer the land = it had=20 acquired to Ohio Power, controlled by parent company AEP. They were = simply told=20 that "something big" was coming to the area. In 1970 the realty = company's=20 intentions were revealed when Ohio Power announced it was going to build = the=20 enormous, coal-fired General James M. Gavin Power Plant.

Touted as a key component of a modern power = complex in=20 the early 1970s, construction of the Gavin plant commenced soon after = passage of=20 the Clean Air Act in 1970. Completed in 1974, the plant was ideally = situated to=20 receive coal overland from nearby mines as well as via barges plying the = Ohio=20 River. It housed two of the world's largest coal-fired generating = units--twin=20 1.3-million-kilowatt turbines capable of powering 2.6 million homes. It = remains=20 the largest generating unit in Ohio and the second largest in AEP's = eleven-state=20 system.( n1)= =20 It burns approximately 25,000 tons of coal per day (Seelye 2002).

The plant was originally equipped with a = 1,103-foot=20 smokestack and two 492-foot cooling towers (Whissel 1973b). In an = attempt to=20 reduce sulfur dioxide emissions, plant operators washed the coal before = burning=20 it and blended low-sulfur coal from Utah and Wyoming with the higher = sulfur Ohio=20 coal (Whissel 1975). Outfitted with two 9000-horsepower fans, the tall=20 smokestack would effectively "release the unremovable sulfur dioxide far = above=20 the ground and allow it to be dissipated by winds" (Whissel 1973b; = Hawthorne=20 2002d). As was the case with other "smokestack industries," the company = fought=20 new environmental regulations at every turn, maintaining that stringent=20 air-pollution laws would cripple the industry and lead to skyrocketing = utility=20 bills (Hawthorne 2002c; see also Huggard 1994; Bridge 2000). In time, = AEP would=20 invest hundreds of millions of dollars in pollution-control devices.

Buoyed by predictions that 2,000-3,000 new = jobs, mostly=20 in the mining sector, would be created, the project generated = considerable=20 optimism. To meet the challenge the Appalachian Regional Commission, the = Economic Development Administration, and the Farmer's Home = Administration hired=20 a planning firm to identify "immediate impact counties" and "secondary = impact=20 counties," to project economic growth from new jobs, and to calculate = growth=20 from multipliers of the project. More precisely, the firm's mission was = "to=20 determine the actual size and characteristic of the impact which will = occur,=20 determine the facilities and programs required to accommodate and = optimize the=20 impact, assess the capacity of the existing facilities and programs, to = identify=20 deficiencies, and then recommend project and program financing = priorities"=20 (Hammer, Greene, Siler Associates 1973, 1).

Although the economic benefits that would = accrue to=20 Cheshire were estimated to be relatively small, residents hoped the = project=20 would bring jobs and growth to a town that had depended heavily on = agriculture=20 and coal mining:

The hum and whine of huge machinery has = shattered the=20 peace and quiet of the small community of Cheshire as the $488 million = Gavin=20 Power Plant gets under way. =E2=80=A6 It will bring problems as well as = potential growth=20 for the area. =E2=80=A6 Cheshire is getting ready to meet the challenge. = =E2=80=A6 Village=20 officials are taking necessary steps for annexation of a portion of the = area=20 within one half mile of the north corporation limits. =E2=80=A6 Revenue = from a larger=20 tax structure would help the village financially. (Cross 1971)

By early 1973 the overly optimistic growth = figures were=20 being revised:

The "impact" of the Gen. James M. Gavin Power = Plant upon=20 rural Meigs, Vinton and Gallia Counties may prove to be far different = from what=20 area residents have been expecting. =E2=80=A6 Only four months ago, = planners were=20 estimating a permanent regional population increase of up to 18,000 = persons by=20 1980. That now seems to be about 12,000 persons too optimistic. = =E2=80=A6 Projected=20 jumps in the number of permanent housing units in such surrounding = communities=20 as Cheshire, Pomeroy, Middleport, McArthur, Gallipolis, Wilkesville and = Wellston=20 have, thus far, all but failed to materialize. (Whissel 1973a)

From the outset it was clear that most of the = jobs at=20 the plant, as well as those in the dedicated mines, would be filled by=20 individuals living outside the community.

Nor was the town able to annex nearby land. = Much to the=20 disappointment of village officials, Cheshire found itself in the = "unique=20 position of being surrounded by land owned now by the power company" (B. = Jones=20 1971). Soon townspeople were voicing concern over the new development: = "At=20 present the villagers are not happy with what has happened to their = community as=20 it becomes smothered not only by dust but by other things as well. They = are not=20 happy with the rattle and hum of huge machinery on their highways, the = traffic=20 tieups which promise to multiply, hazardous roads for school buses, and = perhaps=20 most of all, the loss of their peace and quiet" (B. Jones 1971). = Residents even=20 contemplated relocation: "Where the town planned to expand, there is no = place in=20 which to expand. Some residents have commented that the entire village = should=20 relocate, but that isn't an easy solution either" (B. Jones 1971). = Nevertheless,=20 inhabitants of Cheshire remained hopeful: "To the community residents it = looks=20 as if big industry is walking over the small fellow. In looking on the = side of=20 industry, it is fact that a large company cannot spend millions in = building a=20 plant without changing the area. When the plant is completed the noise = and dust=20 will subside but the economic effect should be a big plus for the area" = (B.=20 Jones 1971).

Throughout the construction phase, residents = complained=20 about the changes that were occurring all around them. According to = newspaper=20 reports, Mayor Walter Scott Lucas and village maintenance man Edward = Preston=20 were "besieged with calls from the residents" about various problems, = ranging=20 from increased dust and depleted water wells to accelerated erosion and=20 congested roads (B. Jones 1971; Lovell 1971, 1972). They also protested = the=20 construction of a proposed coal and oil unloading facility (Lovell = 1971).

Problems continued after the plant opened. = Unlike Kyger=20 Creek, operations at Gavin had a marked effect on the local population. = On 4=20 March 1976 one newspaper reported growing impatience with = "around-the-clock=20 noise," noting that thirty-five village residents had registered = complaints at a=20 town council meeting in March: "Mayor Lucas said village folks also are = 'up in=20 arms' over the dirt from the plant and additional dirt and coal flying = off=20 trucks bringing coal to the plant?' Another commented: "Progress may be=20 wonderful, but there are a lot of people in this village who could do = without=20 some of the progress they have experienced in the past few years. To = them=20 progress has meant inconvenience and hardship with few if any = compensating=20 benefits. They feel that they have been attacked from all four = directions as=20 well as the air above and blame their misfortune on their neighbor, the = Gen.=20 James M. Gavin Plant of the Ohio Power Co. which is situated on land = adjoining=20 the village" (Lovell 1976).

In addition to these disturbances, residents = complained=20 about increased truck traffic and its attendant dust, fumes, and smoke,=20 riverbank erosion caused by turbulence created by the powerful towboats = used to=20 serve the power plant's loading facilities, and poor radio and = television=20 reception. Barge traffic on the river was responsible for other = problems, too:=20 "Coal in one of the barges waiting to be unloaded caught fire and the = smoke from=20 it hung over the area for days until the fire burned itself out. = Residents say=20 they have complained to both the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the = Coast=20 Guard but neither organization has given them any relief" (Lovell 1976). = Nor=20 could the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA) or the Gallia = County=20 prosecuting attorney offer residents respite from the dust, smoke, and = noise=20 associated with plant operations, prompting one resident, Robert = Cornelius, to=20 comment: "I left Pennsylvania in 1943 on account of pollution and now = I'm in the=20 center of it." Still, villagers were reluctant to relocate: "In spite of = their=20 hardships most of the residents do not want to leave. They enjoyed the = community=20 before their giant neighbor moved in and feel that their lives could = again be=20 pleasant if they were shown just a little more consideration" (Lovell = 1976).

Throughout the 1980s, residents put up with = the noise,=20 especially squeaks from belts transporting coal to the power plant, = which=20 sometimes kept them up at night. They put up with stack rain, = particulate=20 matter, and ash, which showered the town on a regular basis (Hawthorne = 2002a;=20 Hampson 2004). One resident interviewed stated that AEP regularly paid = for=20 Cheshire residents to have their cars repainted. "Every car we've had = since 1984=20 has had an insurance claim on it. We got our car repainted and went on = with it?'=20 Aerial photographs taken in 1951, 1958, 1981, and 1983 reveal the extent = to=20 which effluents from the cooling towers and smoke from the plant's stack = affected the village (Figure 3). The plant's smoke was also dispersed = over a=20 wider area (Hampson 2004). In an attempt to draw attention to the = deleterious=20 effects of acid rain pollution in the northeastern United States, = Greenpeace=20 activists parachuted off the 1,103-foot stack during the 1980s (Gillman = 2002).=20 Although residents sometimes aired their grievances, they tolerated the = plant's=20 side effects because it kept the mines open. By the mid-1990s attitudes = began to=20 change.

To comply with federal Clean Air Act mandates = on sulfur=20 emissions, AEP cut down Gavin's 1,103-foot stack in 1995 and replaced it = with=20 two 830-foot stacks. Sulfur dioxide scrubbers were added about the same = time.=20 Although the plant emitted less sulfur dioxide overall, the changes = created new=20 problems (Gillman 2002). Writing for the New York Times, Katharine = Seelye notes:=20 "With these changes, the plant could still burn its high-sulfur coal, = which is=20 dirtier but cheaper than low-sulfur coal, but it also meant that = emissions fell=20 closer to home" (2002). Nevertheless, with those control devices in = place at=20 Gavin, which had long been a leading producer of sulfur dioxide = nationally, air=20 pollution emanating from Ohio power plants was reduced significantly = (Hawthorne=20 2002b, 2002d).

Then, in June 2000, the company announced = plans to=20 install selective catalytic-reduction (SCR) technology "as the first = component=20 of an emerging environmental compliance plan" to "address federal = requirements=20 to control nitrogen oxide (NOx) emissions" (Any 2000a, 1). The project = entailed=20 on-site storage of 360,000 gallons of anhydrous ammonia (AEP 2000a; = Kelly=20 2002a). Residents soon learned that a major leak could produce a = worst-case=20 scenario in which the town and three nearby schools would have = approximately six=20 minutes to evacuate (Hawthorne 2002b). Officials maintained that the = project=20 would not exceed required air-quality standards. The OEPA stated that no = permit=20 was needed because the SCR system was designed to earn pollution credits = and=20 meet future standards. The first public hearing on the matter was held = in=20 September 2000. Wearing masks, villagers picketed the meeting. They also = expressed their concerns via a series of public demonstrations set up = along the=20 main road in town (Figure 4). On 18 December 2000 AEP announced it would = use=20 solid urea pellets instead of anhydrous ammonia (AEP 2000b; Hawthorne=20 2001a).

THE ROAD TO DISSOLUTION

The rest of the story is familiar to anyone = who has=20 followed events in the news media. In June 2001, a sulfuric acid cloud = or "blue=20 plume" made its first appearance. One seventeen-year resident = interviewed=20 described seeing the cloud "crawl down the stacks and =E2=80=A6 roll = across the park"=20 and through the town. Villagers reported eye irritations, burns and = blisters on=20 their lips and tongues, sore throats, and headaches (Zachariah 2001). = Plume=20 "touchdowns" were reported on more than a dozen occasions over the next = several=20 weeks. They were most likely to appear on "hot, humid, stagnant days" = and=20 usually required "a downward wind to push them toward Cheshire" (Downing = 2001).

Ironically, the problem was linked to the = installation=20 of the new pollution-control devices. The interaction of the SCR system = with the=20 sulfur dioxide control equipment produced sulfur trioxide, which, when = it came=20 into contact with moisture from the wet scrubbers, produced "aerosol = sulfuric=20 acid." The formation of the cloud was made worse by the burning of = high-sulfur=20 coal (Hawthorne 2001a). Another complicating factor was that a SCR = system had=20 never been installed on a plant as large as Gavin (Hawthorne 2002a). The = plant's=20 general manager noted that the appearance of aerosol sulfuric acid took = the=20 company by surprise: "I did not know we were going to have plume = problems,=20 [Duane] Phlegar said of the installation of the new Selective Catalytic=20 Reduction equipment" (Williamson 2001). The SCRS, one for each of the = plant's=20 generating units, were designed to operate during the "smog season;' = roughly May=20 through September. Although the system did not have to be activated = until May=20 2003 to meet a federal deadline, AEP turned it on early in order to earn = pollution credits (Downing 2002b). With respect to air-quality = standards,=20 Hawthorne states: "While Ohio doesn't set limits on the amount of = sulfuric acid=20 in the air, levels measured in clouds spewing out of the Gavin plant's = twin,=20 830-foot stacks have exceeded standards established by other states" = (2001a).=20 AEP officials maintained, however, that "at no time during the plant's = operation=20 did emissions in the plume exceed any health-based ambient air quality = standards=20 or permissible exposure limits established by federal or state = regulations" (AEP=20 2002b, 2002c, 1).

Despite the concerns and discomforts, = residents were=20 guarded in their response to the situation. Although some remained = confident=20 that the company, which pays more than $6.74 million annually in = property taxes,=20 would solve the problem, others were "worried and scared" (Zachariah = 2001;=20 Hawthorne 2001b). And then there were individuals like Cheshire Mayor = Tom Reese,=20 who commented, "We feel like they are experimenting on us" (quoted in = Hawthorne=20 2001b). Although the OEPA had installed air-monitoring equipment, = residents were=20 becoming increasingly disenchanted with the agency. One villager opined, = "You=20 rearrange the letters and you get AEP." With the "smog season" over and = the SCRS=20 shut down, AEP searched for a solution.

Matters went from bad to worse in the eyes of = many=20 residents when company officials announced in early 2002 that they = wanted to add=20 a synthetic fuels plant to the Gavin site (Kelly 2002a). DTE Energy = Company, a=20 subsidiary of Detroit Edison, had already filed an application with the = state in=20 January to construct the facility (Kelly 2002c). Again, residents made = their=20 concerns known to the company. Reese, in particular, questioned the = wisdom of=20 adding a new "chemical cocktail" to the mix (Kelly 2002b). U.S. = Congressman Ted=20 Strickland urged the OEPA to block the permit until safety concerns = could be=20 satisfactorily addressed (Kelly 2002e).

Meanwhile, a report by the Agency for Toxic = Substances=20 Disease Registry, a division of the Centers for Disease Control and = Prevention,=20 released its study of the Cheshire area and concluded that Gavin's = emissions,=20 though not life threatening, posed a health risk to the community (ATSDR = 2002;=20 Downing 2002b; Kelly 2002c, 2002d). Another report, compiled by a = coalition of=20 environmental organizations and a New Jersey utility company, found = AEP's=20 coal-fired plants "pound for pound, relative to the electricity they = produce;'=20 to be "among the dirtiest in the country." AEP responded by noting that = it "has=20 spent or plans to spend $2.3 billion to reduce pollution at its plants" = and,=20 further, that the company was in compliance with the 1990 Clean Air Act = (Torry=20 2002). Yet another study, this one conducted for the Rockefeller Family = Fund,=20 predicted that in the year 2007 alone "1,400 people will die prematurely = because=20 of pollution from AEP's 21 plants across the U.S." (Ecologist 2002).

In February 2002 AEP announced that it would = spend $7=20 million on a solution to inhibit the formation of sulfur trioxide and = thereby=20 prevent the reappearance of the sulfuric clouds that had plagued the = town the=20 previous summer. The company intended to inject water, magnesium = hydroxide, and=20 calcium hydroxide at various stages of the combustion and = pollution-control=20 processes (Downing 2002a; Kelly 2002d). AEP also stepped up efforts in = the media=20 to reassure the public of its good intentions (Ashooh 2002).

Frustrated and fearful of being treated like = guinea pigs=20 to test AEP'S new "fix," villagers continued to work with various = environmental=20 groups, including the Buckeye Environmental Network and Congressman = Strickland=20 (Downing 2002b). Strickland recommended that they seek legal help. = Lawyers from=20 four different firms--one from Cleveland and three from Washington, = D.C.--were=20 hired to represent Cheshire. Townspeople wanted compensation and = cleanup.=20 However, when lawyers returned from their meeting with AEP, the only = option on=20 the table was a plan to buy the town for $20 million. Lawyers said they = could=20 take the case to court but warned residents it could drag on for = years.

"CHESHIRE SOLD!"

Tired of doing battle with AEP, a large = majority of=20 Cheshire's citizens accepted the buyout offer. State and local press and = wire=20 services broke the story on 16 April 2002. The Gallipolis Daily Tribune = carried=20 a banner headline that simply read, "Cheshire Sold!" Other newspapers = were more=20 prosaic in their response. Over the next several weeks, journalists from = across=20 the country converged on the village to learn the details (Kelly 2002h). = The=20 houses would cost AEP approximately $13.5 million. The lawyers who = brokered the=20 deal would receive $5.6 million. Close to $1 million would cover = payments to=20 renters and miscellaneous costs. It was also learned that people living = just=20 outside the corporate limits would not receive a buyout offer. Neither = would=20 nearby schools. Most disturbing, however, was that residents would sign=20 agreements promising not to sue AEP for any damage to their health or = property=20 caused by the plant (Hawthorne 2002d; Wheeler 2002). A press release = from AEP=20 confirmed this point: "As part of this agreement, we are resolving all = claims of=20 impacts that the residents have" (AEP 2002a, 1).

In the end, the crisis divided the town's = citizens=20 (Kelly 2002f; Hampson 2004). Several longtime residents refused to move = (Downing=20 2002c; Simon 2002). Others located outside the buyout zone were bitter = (Dempsey=20 2002; Lane 2002b; Price 2002; Ross 2002a). School officials questioned = the terms=20 of the deal (Carter 2002; Lane 2002a). Still others accused the mayor = and=20 village council of bargaining away people's homes during secret = negotiations=20 (Buckley 2002; Kelly 2002g). And then there were those who said AEP = should have=20 bought the town years ago (Ross 2002b). Contributors to local editorial = pages=20 weighed the pros and cons of the deal for months. Meanwhile, AEP = maintained that=20 it had negotiated a "property acquisition" deal that would allow it to = expand=20 operations and that the Gavin site did not pose a health risk to nearby=20 residents (AEP 2002a; Dempsey 2002; Price 2002). AEP officials also = charged that=20 the Columbus Dispatch, in particular, had provided the public with = misleading=20 coverage (Heydlauff 2002, 2003).

Despite the vigorous opposition of several = holdouts, the=20 Cheshire buyout was finalized on 24 September 2002 (Kelly 2002i). = Although=20 summer skies were much clearer over Cheshire in 2002, a "hazy bluish = plume"=20 swept through the town as residents prepared for their last village = picnic (Lane=20 2002c). However, just when it looked as though Cheshire would be = completely=20 demolished, residents, complying with state regulations, voted by a wide = margin=20 against dissolution. Instead, they elected a new mayor and developed a = plan to=20 annex a portion of neighboring Cheshire Township (Price 2003, 2004a). = Although=20 AEP had "bought" the town and razed most of its structures, it did not=20 officially die.

THE PRICE OF CHEAP POWER

Thus ends the story of how the nation's = largest utility,=20 with revenues of $61.3 billion in 2001, bought a town for $20 million = (Stammen=20 2002; Wheeler 2002). Why did they do it? Ostensibly to expand their coal = loading=20 facilities. Legal and environmental experts agree, however, that the = purchase=20 will help the company avoid considerable expense and public-relations = costs=20 associated with individual lawsuits down the road. As one expert put it, = "Companies want to limit any impact to their bottom line. =E2=80=A6 = Better to pay $20=20 million today than potentially having to pay a $100 million jury verdict = years=20 later" (Hawthorne 2002b). AEP likely benefited in other ways from the = buyout. It=20 is not entirely certain, for instance, whether the utility will have to = take any=20 action if the blue clouds return because sulfuric acid is not currently=20 regulated under the Clean Air Act, although company officials did enter = into a=20 voluntary cooperative agreement with the U.S. EPA and the OEPA to = address the=20 issue (AEP 2002b; Hawthorne 2002c). With the "eyes and ears" of the = community=20 gone, AEP may have acquired more breathing room when it comes to = monitoring=20 their emissions (Gillman 2002). But there is a risk that the Cheshire = deal may=20 set a dangerous precedent. Already, residents of one southwestern Ohio = town=20 situated near a coal-fired power plant have met to discuss whether they = may be=20 eligible for a similar deal (Downing 2002C; T. Jones 2002). Also, it has = yet to=20 be determined how the village's annexation plan may affect plant = operations in=20 the future (Price 2004b).

Of course, many of Cheshire's residents = benefited as=20 well. They were able to move away from an area which had become a more = difficult=20 place in which to live. However, the costs were high. As a 2004 headline = in USA=20 Today put it, "Pollution Unites Town, but Solution Tears It Apart" = (Hampson=20 2004). Today, former residents continue to be dogged by questions: "Was = the=20 power company being a good corporate citizen? Or did it play them for = suckers?=20 Did they sell out their town? Or are they simply getting out before it's = too=20 late?" (Buckley 2002).

Although Cheshire was not a company town in = the=20 traditional sense, AEP's power and influence created conditions that, at = times,=20 placed residents at a considerable disadvantage. To begin with, they = were=20 virtually surrounded by land controlled by AEP. Since the early 1970s, = they had=20 been compelled to react to forces largely beyond their control. Prior to = 1995,=20 their complaints and concerns were often tempered by the perceived--and = largely=20 unrealized--economic benefits that the Gavin plant brought to the = region. Their=20 more vigorous response to problems that arose after 1995 reflects the = serious=20 nature of the issues involved--the proposed storage of anhydrous ammonia = on-site=20 and the appearance of aerosol sulfuric acid. These should be viewed not = as=20 isolated events but as the latest in a series of responses dating back = more than=20 thirty years.

So why did Cheshire's demise attract national = and even=20 international attention? Although the displacement of residents = certainly piqued=20 the curiosity of American audiences, the story appeared to strike a much = deeper=20 chord, for it reminded us that our energy consumption has negative = consequences.=20 As one editorialist from the Columbus Dispatch phrased it, however: "Let = the=20 engines that light our rooms, preserve our food, send water to our taps = and=20 sound the emergency alarms shut down for even an hour and few of us in = central=20 Ohio will give a hoot about the air over Cheshire or the 221 souls who = breathe=20 it" (Hallett 2002). Viewed in this light, Cheshire may be the latest = casualty on=20 a growing list of "energy sacrifice zones"--communities "surrendered to = keep=20 power cheap" (Purdy 2002, 213). Given the obstacles that currently stand = in the=20 way of a meaningful transition to renewable energy sources, it may not = be the=20 last (Wilk 2002; Heiman and Solomon 2004). How the story will play out = in the=20 end is difficult to predict. If other electricity producers follow AEP's = example--which appears to be unprecedented for a utility--then the next = few=20 years may cause us to rethink the way we view these largely hidden = "landscapes=20 of power."

The authors wish to thank Brad Jokisch, the = newspaper=20 clippings files, Mahn Center for Archives and Special Collections, Ohio=20 University Libraries, and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful = comments=20 and assistance.

FOOTNOTE=20

(n1.) AEP's seven operating units serve = portions of=20 Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Oklahoma, = Tennessee,=20 Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia (AEP 2006).

TABLE I--FIVE DAYS = OF LAND=20 TRANSFERS IN CHESHIRE, OHIO, 1969

Legend for =
Chart:

A - DATE
B - DEED
C - NAME
D - ACREAGE

    A                   B              C              D

December 15          175-75         Doss             1.45
December 15          175-161-1      Swisher        101.99
December 15          175-171-3      Swisher          89.3
December 15          175-179        Martin           0.69
December 19          175-216        Ramey           5.972
December 20          175-235        Harrison        0.528
December 20          175-239        Stitner          9.25
December 20          175-245        Herrman        145.58
December 20          175-271        Houcks           26.0
December 20          175-281        Duncan           30.0
December 20          175-291        Casto            2.39
December 20          175-297        Jenkins          2.44
December 20          175-301        Ward            11.63
December 20          175-317        Swisher        189.55

Source: Gallia County Auditor's Office.

MAP: FIG. 1--The rural community of Cheshire, = Ohio,=20 located on the Appalachian Plateau and the Ohio River, combined the = locational=20 advantages of a greenfield site near coal resources and a major=20 water-transportation artery. (Cartography by Nicole Stump, Ohio = University=20 Cartographic Center)

PHOTO (BLACK & WHITE): FIG. 2--Cheshire's = main=20 intersection, with the General James M. Gavin Power Plant looming in the = background. Cheshire's economic life was that of an Ohio village with = some=20 food-associated manufacturing--flour milling and barrel making, it was = probably=20 ahead of more remote locations because it had a high school by 1925. At = that=20 time the village population was about 350. The village was officially=20 incorporated in the 1950s, when the importance of the river corridor for = power=20 generation was beginning with the downstream investment in the Kyger = Creek=20 coal-fired power plant. When the Gavin Power Plant was built in the = 1970s, the=20 area was not considered a prime growth area, and minimal local impact = and=20 employment were correctly anticipated. Instead, village residents were = employed=20 in the riverine growth sectors of the economy, where federal programs = pumped=20 development money into chemical and other industries along the Ohio = River. At=20 the time of the buyout the population was around 220. (Photograph by = Geoffrey L.=20 Buckley, November 2002)

PHOTO (BLACK & WHITE): FIG. 3--Aerial = photographs=20 reveal the extent to which emissions from the Gavin Power Plant have = affected=20 Cheshire. The image on the left was taken in 1958; the one on the right, = in=20 1981. (Reproduced courtesy of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, = Natural=20 Resources Conservation Service)

PHOTO (BLACK & WHITE): FIG. 4--When = American=20 Electric Power announced plans to store anhydrous ammonia at the Gavin = Power=20 Plant, residents expressed their disapproval. Initially the company = proposed a=20 nitrogen oxide reduction procedure that would have placed large storage=20 facilities for the ammonia very near to the village. In the event of an=20 accident, projected evacuation of the town could not occur in time to = protect=20 its residents. To assure that the safety of the villagers was in the = mix,=20 individuals made signs and engaged in displays along the main route to = enlighten=20 anyone who drove by the plant. Ultimately, the emphasis on health issues = moved=20 the company to the decision to adopt the technology that ended up = creating the=20 counterproductive blue haze--and a different kind of health hazard. = (Photographs=20 by Jennifer Harrison, 2000; reproduced courtesy of the = photographer)

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~~~~~~~~

By Geoffrey L. Buckley; Nancy R. Bain and = Donald L.=20 Swan

DR. BUCKLEY is an associate professor of = geography at=20 Ohio University, Athens, Ohio 45701

DR. BAIN is a professor of geography at Ohio = University,=20 Athens, Ohio 45701

MR. SWAN is a master's degree candidate in = geography at=20 Central Washington University, Ellensburg, Washington 98926.

Copyright of Geographical Review is the = property of=20 American Geographical Society and its content may not be copied or = emailed to=20 multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's = express=20 written permission. However, users may print, download, or email = articles for=20 individual use.

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